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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to analyze the current problems between Turkey and Greece by making 
special references to the European Union (EU) and NATO. The interesting point in Turo-
Greek relations took place after these countries began to seek ways to integrate 
themselves with the western world by seeking membership in the major institutions of 
this block, mainly EU and NATO. 
Although many circles both from these countries and from the international community 
had expected that possible membership of Turkey and Greece in these international 
organizations would suffice for the emergence of a peaceful and cooperative relationship 
b~tween these countries, the developments following their membership in these 
organizations disproved them. While, on one hand, the old problems between these two 
intensified, on the other hand, there took place some new points of contentions over 
Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. The major aim of this study is to have a brief look at the 
characteristics of bilateral relations within the framework of EU and NATO. The writer 
aims at analyzing the possible roles of these above-mentioned organizations in the 
deterioration of bilateral relations by making special reference to the problems which 
have been arisen due to the involvement of these international bodies in bilateral 
relations. A special emphasis has been made to the role of the EU in developments that 
took place in the course of the Cyprus dispute. Especially, the membership prospects of 
the Greek Cyprus Government in the EU, that gain importance after the EU included 
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Cyprus in the membership list in December, 1997, have been analyzed keeping in mind 
the possible repercussions of this development in solution of the Cyprus dispute. 
One of the major aims of this study is to show that Turkey and Greece might create a 
suitable environment to make progress in the solution of their disputes, as soon as they 
cooperate seriously under the roof of NATO. Trying to solve problems within NATO 
framework, rather than using EU mechanisms, would yield more positive results in the 
near future. 
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OZET 
Bu c;:ah~manm temel amac1 Tiirkiye ile Yunanistan arasmdaki mevcut sorunlan Avrupa 
Birligi ve NATO 9en;:evesinde inclelemektir. ikili ili~kilerde ilgirn;: olan geli~me bu iki 
tilkenin kendilerini BatI dtinyasmm temel organizasyonlan clan A vrupa Birligi ve 
NATO' ya dahil etmek istemeye ba~lamalarmdan sonra ortaya c;:1km1~tir. 
Hemekadar, hem bu tilkelerde hem de uluslararas1 camiada bir9ok 9evre Tilrkiye ve 
Yunanistan'm muhtemel bir AB yada NATO ilyeligi sonucunda aralarmda bar1~a ve 
yardrmla~maya dayah ili~kilerin ortaya 91kacagm1 umduysa da, sonraki geli~meler bunlan 
haks1z 91kardi. Bir taraftan eski problemler coziilmezken, diger taraftan K.ibns' da ve Ege 
Denizi'nde yeni ihtilaflar ortaya 91kti. Yazann buradaki temel amac1 iki iilke arasmdaki 
ili~kilerin bozulmasmda bu uluslarars1 organizasyonlann muhtemel etkilerini 
incelemektir. Ozellikle K1bns sorununun geli~iminde AB'nin Gilney K1bns Rum 
Yonetimi'ni iiyelik silrecine dahil etme karan, bu kararann K1bns sorumunun cozilmilne 
muhtemel etkileri 9er9evesinde, incelencektir. 
Eserde ki temel argilmanlardan birisi de, iki illkenin NATO 9er9evesinde i~birligi 
yaptiklan takdirde, muhtemel bir c;:oziim ic;:in gerekli olan ortamm yarat1lacagm1 
gostermek olacakt1r. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Among the disputes in the world, the long-running Turco-Greek Dispute seems really 
different from all the others owing to its peculiarities and the large content ranging 
from the contentions in the Aegean Sea to the thorny Cyprus problem. Although the 
Greek and Turkish nations, under different authorities, have been living side by side 
for centuries, they could not establish a peaceful relationship; instead they have 
always competed with each other in many areas. 
The reason why I chose to write a dissertation on this issue relates to my curiosity 
how it could be possible that these nations, despite their all closeness and togetherness 
in history, could not manage to solve their problems. The interesting point stems from 
the irony that the togetherness of these nations within the same international structures 
and within the same camps does not seem to suffice for peaceful coexistence. True, 
many might jump to the conclusion that their cooperation within the same 
international structures would help them settle the points of contentions; but the 
conflict between these two NATO allies has intensified since they became members 
of Western institutions, over the last few decades, bringing them to the brink of a full-
scale war several times either over the contentious continental self issue or a couple of 
pieces of small rocks in Eastern Mediterranean as the latest incident indicated. 
A cursory look at the Turco-Greek dispute and the intervention of the third parties at 
various stages does indicate that the third parties somehow contribute to the formation 
of perceptions and mistrust in each country about the other. For instance, the EU is 
always regarded in Turkey with justice as a pro-Greek institution. And NATO is taken 
with a pinch of salt by the Greek public in general. It seems that the third party 
involvement is an important part of the conflict, and, therefore, an attempt will be 
made to examine various third party initiatives and their results. 
As shown in the second chapter, the Greek nation could get its independence mainly 
through the help of outside powers and this fact later enabled these countries to shape 
this newly borne Greek nation according to their ideals. In this respect, the imposition 
of "Hellenism" on the Greek nation necessitated the portrayal of the Turks as their 
enemy par excellence. This in turn determined in the next decades, especially after the 
W.W.II, the main patterns of Greek behaviour towards Turkey. After presenting the 
main characteristics of Ottoman-Greek relations both during the era of Ottoman 
domination over the Greek origin subjects and of the state-to-state relations between 
the independent Greece and the Ottoman Empire, dynamics of relations between 
Greece and the newly born Turkish Republic until the- end of WWII will be taken up 
in the same chapter. Here, the major aim of the present study would be to show that 
these countries did not experience a relatively peaceful co-existence since they could 
not eradicate the underlying causes of problems, mainly the psychological barriers. 
In the third chapter, the main point of consideration will be an analysis of the current 
problems with special reference to their togetherness in the same international block 
following the W.W.II. The reasons why Greece and Turkey could not formulate a 
peaceful relationship throughout this period will be explored in the context of their 
Europeannes. In this respect, the deterioration of bilateral relations was mainly a 
product of the Cyprus dispute. The outbreak of the Cyprus crisis initially as a 
headache in the relations prevented them from constructing a cooperative and 
peaceful relationship during the cold war era. After mentioning reasons for the lack of 
cooperation in bilateral relations, in the next sections, the Cyprus Dispute and the 
Aegean Sea Problems will be handled respectively. The role of the third parties in the 
emergence of the dispute as well as in the deterioration of bilateral relations between 
Turkey and Greece will always be a major point of consideration. 
In the fourth chapter, possible causes of disputes that took place in the cold war era 
will be tackled. Although both decided to anchor themselves to the western world, 
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and in this way searched for the same means, they could not achieve a peaceful 
atmosphere between one another. Possible reasons for the emergence of Aegean 
disputes, ranging from the delimitation of the territorial waters to the sharing of the 
command and control responsibilities within NATO, and of the Cyprus dispute will 
be analyzed in their association within NATO. Throughout this chapter, first bilateral 
relations within the European Union Context, and then within the NA TO framework 
will be analyzed. In the European Union section, first the attitudes of the Union 
towards the Turco-Greek disputes in the absence of Greek membership will be 
studied. In other words, the hands-off policy of the then EC, European Community, 
will be looked at. Afterwards, an attempt will be made to demonstrate how the Union 
started to side with Greece, and that Greece began to use the mechanisms of the 
Union in order to force Turkey to yield to Greece's demands. 
One of the major arguments this study comes up with is that the bilateral disputes 
became more complicated with the involvement of the European Union in the 
relations. The deadlock in the solution process of the Cyprus dispute has largely 
resulted from the interference of the Union with the Cyprus question, and from the 
use of the EU mechanisms by Greece against Turkey. The old-established objective of 
becoming a member of the European Union weakened Turkey's hand against Greece, 
given that Greece is a full member of the Union and has the right to veto Turkey's 
membership. In the second section of this chapter, NATO will become the 
international organization whose role will be examined. Despite the togetherness of 
Greece and Turkey within this organization, the reasons for their failure to achieve a 
constructive relationship will be looked at, and all the misperceptions both in Greece 
and Turkey with respect to NATO will be scrutinized. 
In the fifth chapter, a :framework will be drawn up for a possible solution to the 
Turco-Greek disputes by concentrating on the feasibility of NA TO as a conflict 
solving mechanism. 
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The concluding chapter will be an assessment of the ideas studied in the preceding 
chapters. Some reflections on prospects regarding the course of Turco-Greek relations 
will also be put in. 
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CHAPTER 2: SURVEY, A HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
Without understanding the realities of the past between the two peoples of the Aegean 
Sea, it might become difficult to comprehend the present Turco-Greek dispute. 
Causes of the currently disputed issues cannot always be founded in the past, but at 
least the emergence of major dynamics that continue to affect the present relationship 
might be discerned. There is no doubt that the Turco-Greek dispute is one between 
two modem nations, and that there is very little historical explanation for it, not least 
because modem Greece and the Ottoman Empire, and then modem Turkey acted in 
the past as strategic allies several times, sometimes for several decades when they saw 
fit. This is not to say, however, that a distorted version of history is not used for 
mobilizing these societies against each other. Each side's version of history becomes 
a good tool for generating arguments for the continuation of the conflict. It is, 
therefore, a good idea to have a glimpse at the way in which history is used. 
From the arrival of Turkish communities in Anotolia to the fall of Istanbul to the 
Ottomans, these people, or more truly their natural antecedents, had been living under 
different authorities. Although the political entities of these communities, the Ottoman 
State and the Byzantine Empire, were cooperating in many fields, they were political 
rivals during this period. There was a kind of equal relationship between these 
political entities. In other words none of them realized full control over the other. 
While the Byzantine Empire had been trying to keep its control over the Balkans and 
Anatolia, the Ottomans had been seeking ways to enlarge their territories and to 
anchor themselves to the Balkans. The Byzantine dynasties were asking the Ottoman 
help both for their throne-struggles and for their attempts to maintain their control 
over the peoples of the Balkans who were challenging the Byzantine rule there. In 
return for their help, the Ottomans could find the chance of first landing in the 
Balkans and then controlling the Byzantine domestic political life through their close 
connections with the dynasty. During this period the Ottomans managed to conquer 
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much of the area and suppressed the Byzantine rule. This kind of Ottoman -Byzantine 
relationship lasted until the fall of Istanbul to the Ottoman Empire during the reign of 
Mehmet the Conqueror. 
Since then, the kind of equal relationship between these communities gave way to 
Ottoman domination over the Byzantine. In spite of the fact that the Ottoman Empire 
subjugated the Orthodox Greeks completely, the Greeks did not suffer. The "Millet" 
system of the Ottoman Empire enabled them to improve their status in contrast to 
Byzantine times. The Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul was not only assigned the role to 
regulate the religious life of the orthodox peoples in the Balkans and all over the 
Empire, as used to be in the Byzantine times, it was also made competent to involve 
in secular issues as well. This fact shows that the Greek Patriarchate improved its 
status under the Ottomans. The importance of this millet system affected the Greek 
community of the Empire in two important ways. On the one hand, they were 
promoted to the leadership of Christian populations of the Empire through the leading 
position of the Patriarchate in Istanbul, on the other hand they became somehow 
associated with the administration of the Empire. 1 That is not to say, however, that the 
influential position of the Greeks during the Ottoman Empire dates back to the fall of 
Istanbul to the Ottomans in 1453. Instead the Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire 
had to wait till the l 81h century to take up a leading position among the non-Muslim 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire. 
Beginning with this century the Phanoriot Greeks were being appointed to the 
governance of the Romanian Principalities by the Ottoman Sultans as hospodars -
local governors -.2 Together with these Phanoriot-origin governors, the Patriarchate in 
Istanbul became one of the sources of Greek influence. But this is not to say that all 
the Greeks under the Ottoman rule were equally prosperous: for instance, the Greek 
peasants of Pelloponesean peninsula had been suffering from the heavy burden of 
taxes and miserable living conditions. In broader terms, Ottoman Greeks were 
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discriminated among themselves regarding their respective positions in the Empire. 
This fact was to play an important role in the process of Greek War of Independence 
with respect to contributions and loyalties of the Greeks to this struggle. As one 
famous historian -Stavrianos - notes, the positions of the Greeks in the Empire during 
the 17th and 18th centuries were reminiscent of the Serbians' during the 16th and 17th 
centuries.3 The privileged status of Greeks also emanated from the appointment of 
phanoriot Greeks to important positions in the state apparatus. This was generally the 
case in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. As the Ottoman Empire began to 
establish foreign affairs department and embassies abroad, the influence of phanoriot 
Greeks increased even more. Because these people spoke more than one foreign 
languages and their ties with the western world were closer than those of the Turks, 
the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy were filled by these people. They were appointed 
either to ambassadorship or to the chief translator - dragoman- positions. 4 Greek 
merchants also contributed to the enlightenment of Greeks either by opening western 
style secular schools where the pupils were being taught the history of ancient Greeks, 
or by providing the clever students with scholarships to study in Europe. 5 
Throughout the nineteenth century the prestigious position of these people started to 
deteriorate. Especially the roles of various fractions of the Greek community, such as 
merchants, Phanoriot Greeks or the clergy declined, as the emergence of modern 
Greek state affected their status negatively. 
The 19th century started for the Ottoman Empire with the revolts of the politically 
tiny and weak sub-nations scattered in the Balkans. Of these, Greek communities 
were first to kick off. Being inspired by the ideas of French Revolution, they thought 
that it was time for their independence following the Serbs's revolt in 1814. General 
weakness of the Ottoman Empire during the early nineteenth century provided 
encouragement for these independence movements. Reasons of the Ottoman decline 
are outside the scope of this study. The present dissertation will focus instead on the 
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reasons and motives leading the Greek people to follow the Serbs' example. Differing 
roles played by various classes of the Greek community scattered all over the Empire 
will also be looked at. 
Regarding the process leading to Greek independence, the first point to be born in 
mind is that it started in non-Greek territories by the efforts of those Greeks who were 
not familiar with the conditions of Morea where the movement gained momentum and 
in the end led to independence. Founded in 1814 in Odessy by the Greek merchants 
and the members of the Phanoriot families, the "Philikia Heteria" organization played 
the key role in the struggle and somehow became the catalyzor of the Greek people. 
Contrary to the expectatio.n of this organization, the movement did not succeed in the 
Romanian Principalities. The fact that these principalities had been ruled by Greek 
hospodars was not enough for the people living there to support the movement. 6 After 
the failure in Romania, they turned to Morea to mobilize the people there. The 
determined Greek masses in the peninsula were more enthusiastic and their conditions 
were more favorable for an uprising which culminated in the Greek independence in 
1830 following the defeat of the Sublime Port in the Ottoman-Russian war of 1828. In 
fact it was the Russians who dictated an independent Greek state to the Porte 
following the latter's defeat. 
As for the role played by the various Greek communities within the Empire and the 
foreign powers of the time, most of the historians could not reach a consensus. The 
fact that this Philikia Heteria organization was established by Greek merchants might 
lead to the idea that the first classes to desire independence were the merchants and 
tradesmen.7 As a famous historian put it: "the contrast between the dazzling world of 
Europe and the wretched conditions at home naturally pointed to the conclusion that 
Turkish rule was incubus that must be cut off as soon as possible. This explains why it 
was the merchants who organized Philikia Heteria revolutionary society who 
compromised the greater part of its members and who took the initiative in the 
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conspiratorial work predatory to the revolutionary outbreak"8 While the situation of 
the merchants were suitable for the outbreak of independence struggle, those of the 
Greek Phanariot families and Orthodox Clergy in Istanbul were not so much 
conducive to their active contribution to the movement. Members of Phanoriot 
families were so close to the Ottoman State bureaucracy that they might have lost 
much more than their gains if they had sided with the rebellions in Morea. But they 
generally helped the resurgent. Therefore, their role in the Ottoman state 
administration decreased to lower levels than it was before.9 
Regarding the role of the Greek clergy, historical evidence is interesting because it 
contradicts with the general convictions prevailing in Turkey about the role of the 
Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul during the Greek war of independence. "The leaders 
of the Orthodox Church was perhaps the most skeptical about revolutionary 
organizations. The top clergy believed that a revolution led by disciple of 
enlightenment would mean not only the destruction of an imperial structure in which 
the Church had a definitive place, but also the destruction of the intellectual 
foundations of Balkan Orthodoxy."10 over which they had had a preponderant position 
for centuries thanks to the Ottoman administration. This is not to say, however, that 
the rank and file of the orthodox clergy was hostile to the rebellion in Morea. 
Evidence suggests that almost many of the rural priest supported the local people and 
provided them with ammunition. The situations of the local Greek administrators 
(primates) were somehow similar to that of Phanariot families. Because they were 
enjoying power under the privileges given by the Ottoman rule, they were somehow 
ambivalent to an appraisal. The expression, "uncircumcised Turks" reflects the 
common disposition toward these people in Greek territories. 11 
One thing that needs a bit of attention here is the active and enormous support of the 
Great Powers of the time, Russia, Britain and France, to the Greek independence 
movement. Without their support and encouragement the Greeks could not have 
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obtained their 'liberation' .12 The rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and the Great 
Powers of Europe led these European states to support the Greek war. Regarding the 
attitudes of the big powers, Russia was the most enthusiastic one among them to see 
the Greeks independent from the Ottomans. Because the Russians were orthodox and 
they perceived themselves as the protector of the rights of the orthodox peoples of the 
Ottoman Empire, they were closer than the other big powers to the Greeks' aim of 
independence. Besides, the Russians thought that if the Greeks were to become 
independent due to their support, they might have gained a strategic ally in the 
Balkans. As a result, the attitudes of the Russians changed considerably in the favor 
of Greeks after throning of Alexander. 
The ambitious new Tzar wanted to partition the Ottoman Empire, and he even 
managed to sign an agreement with Britain as to how to share the territories of the 
Empire. The British government was reluctant to commit itself immediately. But, like 
in Russia, the change of foreign ministry from Castleragh to Caning, Britain began to 
side with the Russians against the Ottomans. This was at a time when all the Great 
Powers were involved in the dispute not to give the others the opportunity to act 
freely and benefit from the developments. In other words, each Power's concern was 
not to lose its privileged status to the others. 13 This foreign involvement which played 
a determining role in the Greek war of independence would have great impact on 
Greece's foreign and domestic policies in the decades to come. The observations of an 
expert support this argument. 
" From a political or economic point of view, directly or indirectly, 
Greece was controlled by foreign powers. Thus President Capodistrias 
had to submit to the allied representatives at the Paros Conference 
statistics concerning frontiers, tribute, and indemnity for lands, including 
large estates that belong to the Turks (chiftlicks). British, Russian and 
German rivalry for regional influence played an important role for the 
forn1ation and the development of the new Greek state and its 
financing." 14 
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The role of foreign involvement in Greece's domestic policy continued with Britain in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and with the Americans after the W.W.II. 
After the veteran politician Constantin Karamanlis became the prime minister 
following the 1974 Cyprus crisis, Greece did start a kind of multidimensional foreign 
policy to reduce her dependence on one foreign power and to implement a policy of 
balance among major powers. Importance of foreign interference with Greece's 
affairs especially came into existence in Greece's relations with Turkey. Since the 
independence of the Greek state, the Greeks could not face the Turks on their own. 
This was obvious in the territorial gains of Greece in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Being encouraged by the great powers in their strategic interests concernmg the 
Ottoman Empire, Greece did enlarge her territories threefold at the expense of the 
Ottoman Empire, firstly taking the Ionian Islands in 1864, secondly the Theselya 
Valley in 1881, and then a large chunk of the Ottoman Macedonia and Crete, as well 
as most of the Eastern Aegean Islands after the Balkan Wars in 1913. The irredentist 
aspirations of Greece reached its zenith after Venizelos came to power, and when he 
landed the Greek troops into Anatolia just after the WWI in order to impose the terms 
of the Sevres Treaty. 
The interesting development in Turco-Greek relations took place in the aftermath of 
the great catastrophe of the Greeks during the early 1920s. Bilateral relations between 
these two countries improved so much that Greece and Turkey finalized very 
important agreements, such as the treaty of 1930 regulating the minority rights in each 
country and thus eradicating the thorny problem of "etabli", and the treaty of 
nonagression and goodneighbourliness signed in 1930. From mid- l 930s to mid-1950s 
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Turkey and Greece acted as strategic allies. That is why historians treat this period in 
Turco-Greek relations as one that demonstrate how it could be possible that the 
countries which are at odds with each other on many things can solve their long-
standing problems and live in peace. Although the international conditions were 
conducive to such a detente between Turkey and Greece, it has to be pointed out that 
all this was certainly a success on the part of the politicians on both shores of the 
Aegean Sea. 
The reasons for rapprochement may be summarized as follows: First of all, after 
having been defeated in Asia Minor, Greece could no longer pursue a totally 
irredentist policy towards Turkey. Her capabilities and resources did not enable her to 
match her long-waited national aspirations; on the contrary they dictated on Greece to 
seek ways for living in peace with Turkey. Instability in domestic political life 
emanating from the deep-rooted rivalry between the royalist and the republicans to 
seize power and the international relations of the post war world were among factors 
which encouraged Greece to improve her relations with Turkey. 
Secondly, the charismatic leader of the Greek political life, Eleftheros Venizelos, 
displayed all kinds of determination and resolution to increase the level of relations 
with Turkey. His personal feature enabled him to dictate his terms upon his people. 
Venizelos was quick to understand that he could not extract the support of the big 
powers in order to implement his expansionist policies vis-a-vis Turkey. His 
perception that the Greek people had been tired of fighting for long years forced him 
to look for ways to relieve his people of troubles of the Great War. 
Thirdly, both Greece and Turkey became known as the status quo states which 
preferred to see the international situation of the post war years unchanged. Both 
countries were pleased with their current boundaries and against any claim requiring 
changes in the territorial frontiers. The behavior of the Bulgarian governments 
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brought them closer because Sofia was not happy with the status quo, and it was busy 
trying to alter it to her advantage. The revisionist policies of this country that was 
caused by her substantial territorial losses on the eve, and in the aftermath of the 
W.W.I, was threatening especially Greece because the former was looking for an 
outlet to the Aegean Sea, and the most suitable country to open this way seemed to be 
Greece. Greece was more eager than Turkey to improve bilateral relations. In case of 
a war with Bulgaria, Turkey seemed the only country to help Greece to ward off the 
aggression. Besides Bulgaria, both countries were perceiving a significant threat 
coming from Italy. Being an unsatisfied country following the Great War, Italy was 
also searching for ways to change the postwar status quo to her favor. The 
Mediterranean was a suitable place for Italy to enlarge her influence and even her 
territories. Explanations and speeches of Italy's charismatic leader, Benito Mussolini, 
especially his reference to Mediterranean Sea as "more nostrum" (our sea) gave rise 
to fears both in Turkey and Greece about Italy's real intentions. Although the Italian 
government concluded bilateral treaties with Greece and Turkey, Mussolini's 
intentions were menacing. 15 
Fourth, in the absence of complex and grinding problems of 1950s and onwards, such 
as Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, there was all the reason for both countries to cooperate 
with each other more easily. 
Fifth, in the improvement of bilateral relations the role of the outside powers should 
not be overlooked. Great Britain encouraged these two to cooperate and to form a 
kind of alliance against the revisionist countries of the region. This was not a one-
sided interest on the part of Britain. Both Greece and Turkey were perceiving Britain 
as the only country with her enormous naval capabilities in the Mediterranean Sea 
which could protect them against these revisionist countries. In this regard, one 
general conclusion might be that these countries cooperated more easily when they 
were encouraged by an influential power in the Mediterranean Sea. 16 
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Most importantly, the leaders of the time, Atattirk and Venizelos, showed both 
determinism and goodwill in the process of improvements of the bilateral relations. 
They did not resort to bilateral problems to gain in domestic policy as it has been the 
case since 1950s. The strong leadership both displayed made them capable of 
constructing their policies easily, without the pressure of strong opposition, and to 
dictate them on their own people. As one expert put it bluntly, the type of regime is 
not really the most important factor before solution. "Democracy does not help to 
resolve the questions. If there were dictators in Greece and Turkey who did not have 
to worry about public opinion, we could have reached an agreement by now". 17 
As far as the crowmng events of this period are concerned, the signing of 1930 
treaties regulating the status quo of the minorities once and for all, and the ones about 
goodneighborliness and nonagression should be remembered. Formation of a Balkan 
Entente among Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia was the climax of bilateral relations. 
Although the alliance established by this entente in 1934 had many defects, it showed 
the resolution of the countries to solve their problems and even to conclude an 
alliance. During the years of World War II Turkey and Greece continued to have good 
relations, and in the aftermath of the war they joined NATO. 
The Psychological Characteristics of the Disputes: 
In the analysis of problems in Turco-Greek relations, the way to look at the causes of 
them is really important. If somebody endeavors to discern the causes of disputes only 
by focusing on historical events and using a purely historical and political approach, 
he/she might neglect the unseen factors which normally sabotage bilateral relations. 
The analysis of current problems between Turkey and Greece should not only be 
made through a historical or political approach, but a psychological approach should 
also be made use of in order to understand the psychological barriers behind the 
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nonsolution of the disputes. A psychological approach assumes that people on both 
shores of the Aegean Sea are biased against each other. Both nations created some 
.. chosen traumas" and "chosen glorious" with respect to the other side and they can 
not escape from the effects of them in any solution process. 18 In the formation of these 
psychological barriers to peace, the creation of chosen traumas and chosen glories had 
important places. Both nations idealized their victories over the other side as their 
chosen glorious and their defeats by the other side as their chosen traumas. On one 
hand, while the Greeks could not finish the process of mourning over their losses of 
Istanbul to the Turks in 1453 and their defeats in Cyprus in 1974, the Turks, on the 
other, could not adopt to the new situation after they lost their Ottoman Empire. Their 
inability to adapt to new changes in territorial boundaries led them to construct chosen 
traumas and to make them alive in the minds of the new generations through 
psychological processes. 
In the creation of Greek state and nation two factors are very significant; the 
idealization of Hellenism, and the concept of Megali Idea. Both had direct concerns 
with the Turks. While Hellenism necessitated the denial of the Greek's existing 
identity as oriental, barbaric, and uncivilized and its whole projection onto the Turks, 
the Megali Idea aimed at liberation of the unredeemed brethren in the old Hellenic 
territories. "Today the Megali Idea and the Hellenism on the one hand, the 
psychology of the Greek people ofremaining victims on the other hand are the unseen 
powers which are imbued in modern Greek group identity and they complicate 
political negotiations, create psychological resistance to solutions and made 
negotiations with the Turks difficult."19 
The fact that there was not a Greek nation when the Greek state was established 
means that the formation of the Greek nation should be called "national building" 
rather than "national awakening". The trend that was common during the process of 
nation state's emergence in the western Europe was not seen in Greece.20 The Greek 
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intellectuals emboldened by liberal and Grekophile western intellectuals had tried to 
link the Greece of 19th century to the ancient Greece. According to them there was a 
continuation in this process. Thus, the "Rums" of the Ottoman Empire, the "Romeics" 
of the Byzantine Empire and the ancient Greeks were the people of the same origin. 21 
As it was the case in the creation of independent Greek state, the help of the western 
intellectuals was decisive in the process of building a nation. Their involvement in 
this process determined the kind of society which this newly born states should 
possess. In short "Hellenism was imposed by the west upon the people who had been 
cut off from its influence for two millennia. m 2 
The existence of these chosen glorious and traumas led them to be preoccupied with 
themselves, and not to trust the other side. The Greeks are much more preoccupied 
with the Turks than the Turks with the Greeks. This can easily be discerned in the 
amount and frequency of information and news that come out in the national press 
directly related to the other side.23 The way the other nation is displayed and 
characterized in the press is also another barrier to negotiations. 
"Embodied in the Greek news media is the image of Turkey as the enemy par 
excellence. Turkey is described as a large, undemocratic, and aggressive power 
disrespectful of human rights. Turkey is inclined to torture and genocide and, is 
now, as in the past, barbaric and uncivilized. In short Turkey is the source of all 
the evil in the world. Greece, on the other hand, is described as totally untithetical 
to Turkey. The Greeks are characterized as being small, innocent, and victims who 
are brave and civilized Christians"24 
While the Turks are described in the father figure, the Greeks are displayed in a 
mother figure just to give the impression the Turks are rapists. 
In the creation of these psychological barriers, the chauvinistic version of nationalistic 
ideology and abuse of this by politicians constitute the other important reason. 
Because it is easy for politicians to get vote in elections through the depiction of the 
other side as the enemy par excellence, the politicians who resort to such measures are 
16 
the main culprits of the unbreakable impasse.25 Until the extermination of these sort of 
politicians and the emergence of a realist and rational approach to problems, it is 
difficult to expect a solution in the near future. 
In the formation of misperceptions on both shores of the Aegean Sea, one factor is 
highly important, that is, the "Western Factor". Both nations formulated their views 
about each other through the eyes of Western Europe. This was because of the huge 
role Western Europe played in the emergence of these nation states. In the imposition 
of "hellenism" on the Greek state the west played the most decisive role by putting it 
as a precondition that this new state must accept in return for western help to get 
independence. In other words, the Greeks were somehow obliged to accept the anti-
Turkish character of hellenism and so to label the Turks as "barbar and uncivilized". 
Because hellenim was formulated in western European capitals and it took all its anti-
Turkish features through the efforts of European Intellectuals in their attempts to 
idealize the Greek civilization as the cradle of the overall western civilization, the 
Greeks did not have so many options to chose but to accept hellenism and embraced 
the anti-Turkish views of the western civilization. 
Likewise, the new Turkish Republic took its reference from Western Europe and 
constructed its anti-Greek stand through the lenses of the West. The Turks had never 
evaluated the Greeks independently of Western Europe; on the contrary they saw 
them as the "naughty-boy" of the West and the collaborator of the western capitalist 
in their vicinity. The fact that both nations have been continuing to evaluate each 
other through the lenses of the "West" has been putting the western world to a very 
important place in the development of bilateral relations. In fact, the west is a living 
dilemma in Turco-Greek relations. While, on one hand, it feels closer to the Greeks 
culturally and idealize them as their idol of civilization, on the other hand, the 
strategic and economic considerations of today's world force them not to leave 
Turkey completely outside of their civilization. This might lead to the point that as 
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long as the west keeps its dilemma towards these countries, these nations 'Nill 
continue to perceive themselves through the views of the "West". This will feed the 
misperceptions and misunderstandings in both countries, making the solution of 
problems more difficult. Since the western world treated these countries differently 
and could not formulate somehow a common approach in the evaluation of them, the 
very existence of strategic cooperation within the same international security structure 
could not suffice for the solution of their problems. 
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CHAPTER 3: TURCO-GREEK DISPUTES IN THE MAKING 
After W.W.Il, Greece and Turkey, entered into a new period in their bilateral relations. This 
era would become completely different from their relations prior to the general war. However, 
the multiplication of the problems that led them to a degree to a collusion course throughout 
the whole post war period, constituted the main characteristic of this new relationship. In 
addition to the diversification of the points of friction, their togetherness in the same 
international platforms became a second significant feature of their post war relations. While 
many people from the both countries were expecting that Greece and Turkey would cooperate 
within these international platfonns and so increase the level of confidence between 
themselves, the developments of this era disproved them. Before analyzing the major points 
of friction that came about in this period, it might be helpful to seek the reasons that paved the 
way for the emergence of tensions in bilateral relations. 
One factor that seems to have caused the general deterioration of bilateral relations during this 
period might be the togetherness of these countries, Turkey and Greece, within the same 
international platforms of the western world, such as NA TO and the European Council. 
Emergence of very complex problems, such as the command and control responsibilities 
within NATO poisoned the relations. In this regard, one might wonder why it was the case. In 
other words, why did these countries chose to follow a collision course in their relations? 
A possible answer to this question might be found in the role of the western world. The fact 
that both Greece and Turkey became members of the same international camp, gave third 
countries, the major western European countries and the United States, an important role to 
play in shaping the character of bilateral Turco-Greek relations. Thus the simplicity of 
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relations, witnessed in the previous period (1923-1950), evaporated and gave way to 
complexity and misunderstandings. The involvement of the third parties in bilateral relations 
did also complicate the solution of the main problems, Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. In 
contrast to the solution process of the minority problem of 1920s, in which Greece and 
Turkey were the only parties and they found the ways of solution on their own, the 
interference of the third parties in the solution process of the problems, that emerged in the 
next decades made a possible settlement more difficult rather than easier. 
One other reason for the deterioration of relations in this period might be the emergence of a 
suitable environment enabling these countries to voice their old arguments more freely. 
Paradoxically having addressed their security considerations under the international 
protection of NATO, both Greece and Turkey did not hesitate to follow a more nationalistic 
foreign policy towards each other. So to speak, both of them were sure that the western 
alliance would not allow them to fight and endanger their security environment in the region. 
This perception led these countries to feel more courageous in voicing their national claims 
with respect to the other side and to act more freely in adding new points of contentions to the 
old ones. 1 The best examples of this policy were noticed during the crisis in the Aegean Sea 
following 1970s onwards. The so-called "brinkmanship" policy has been resorted to several 
times. 1976 Hora Crisis, 1987 Sismik Crisis and lastly the latest Kardak/Imia Crisis of 1996 
are the showcases of perfect implementation of this policy. 
One possible explanation with respect to multiplication of bilateral problems during this 
period might be related to the political regimes of these countries. Although both of them 
embraced the values of the western style democracy and initiated their programs of 
democratization in association with the goal of integrating with the western world, the 
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abundance of disputes in bilateral relations became the characteristic of this period. That is 
not to say that it was democracy which caused all the problems, and which forestalled any 
solution process, but, oddly enough, it was during this period that these countries added new 
ones and exacerbated the old ones. Lack of strong leadership and talented cabinets, caused by 
the failure of politicians to establish strong governments, prevented them from formulating 
rational, realistic and peaceful policy alternatives. In contrast to pre-W.W.II period, in which 
the strong leadership of Atatiirk and ismet inonii, and V enizelos enabled these countries to 
construct solid and realistic policies with respect to each other, the post-war situation created 
an environment in which it was quite difficult for politicians to reach a consensus on their 
policies about the other side. Instead they began to use the existing bilateral problems in order 
to weaken their political rivals and to gain popularity in domestic policy. To formulate 
nationalistic, and somehow chauvinistic policies seemed attractive to them to win election. 
Related to the general climate of post-war world, bilateral relations between Greece and 
Turkey turned out to be multidimensional. In contrast to the simplicity of relations in the pre-
war years, this period was characterized by the variety of bilateral issues. The addition of new 
dimensions to the existing relations made the solution of existing disputes more difficult by 
making settlement of each contingent on the others. In other words, they could not succeed in 
solving any of the disputes completely independent of the others. 
One point that attracts attention is that the US and other western countries did not come up 
with solution proposals to settle down all the thorny problems between Greece and Turkey. 
Even though some people, especially the leftist circles in Turkey and Greece, claim that the 
reason for the West for not seriously trying to solve the Turco-Greek dispute was to keep 
them under control by making them dependent on the West, it seems that the underlying 
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reasons of the Western behaviors were deriving its sources from the conditions of the cold 
war, during which these western countries had to become more cautious in their approach to 
Greece and Turkey because, if they formulated extensive peace proposals, they might have 
offended one of them by appearing to support the arguments of the other.2 
The Cyprus dispute holds a very special place. As both countries started to live under the 
same international structure of the western world, NATO, the coming of Cyprus as a very 
significant point of contention in their first years of togetherness, in 195 5, kept both busy with 
this dispute and affected their respective attitudes towards the other problems of 1970s as 
well. Although historians or analysists of international relations do not need to deal with 
problems that did not occur, it is intriguing to ask the question: but for the Cyprus dispute, 
would Greece and Turkey have still experienced a problematic and uneasy relationship? The 
answer to this question should be looked for in the connection of the Aegean Sea problems 
with the Cyprus dispute. If somebody tries to analyze this, he/she will most probably notice 
that there is a connection between the problems of 1970s in the Aegean Sea with the Cyprus 
problem. It is a fact that the tough stance of these countries in the Cyprus problem led them to 
create some new friction in the Aegean Sea, and to be more intransigent and unyielding in the 
solution process of existing problems.3 For example, the dispute concerning the command and 
control responsibilities within NATO took place after Greece's withdrawal from the military 
wing of NATO following Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Likewise, Greece 
rushed to militarize her Eastern Aegean islands after 1974 Cyprus crisis in blatant 
contravention of the Lausanne Treaty by which Turkey ceded those islands to Greece. 
Although the problems concerning the delimitation of territorial waters and the continental 
shelf in the Aegean Sea had nothing to do with Cyprus, and they were highly related to the 
parties' strategic and economic interests in that sea, the emergence and persistence of the 
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Cyprus dispute had negatively affected the disposition of Greece and Turkey to possible 
solution of aforementioned problems. It is, therefore, plausible to infer from all these cases 
that the emergence of Cyprus dispute had prevented both Greece and Turkey from 
consolidating a period of cooperation and good-neighborliness which they had initiated earlier 
despite their togetherness within the same international platforms, such as NATO. 
Now a cursory look at these problems might help us diagnose the underlying causes of them, 
and maybe derive some principles to be used in the solution process. 
1. The Cyprus Dispute: 
The outbreak of the Cyprus crisis as a headache in Turco-Greek relations was a product of 
post W.W.II developments. Although history might help us understand the motivations with 
regard to the two communities on the island, it seems that the underlying reasons of the 
current dispute did largely come about due to the cold war atmosphere. 
During the Ottoman rule from 1571to1878, the communities on the island lived in a peaceful 
atmosphere, and this continued under the British reign till 1950s. When the Ottomans took the 
island from the Veneticians, a new period started for the local communities. The plight of the 
Greek Orthodox Cypriot community, which suffered during the Venetian rule, improved a lot 
after the Ottomans granted them extensive rights ranging from religious to public area The 
most important privilege they gained was the ethnarch position of their religious leaders. This 
title enabled these religious lea9ers to regulate both social and religious aspects of their live. 
Indeed, this community became one of the associates in the island. Regarding this period, one 
thing is clear that there occurred no rebellion among this community against the Ottoman rule 
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due to their dissatisfaction. There is no evidence that their life standard was in any way lower 
than the Turks. On the contrary, the granting of trade and business sector to this community 
made these people richer than their associates on the island. Although these two communities 
lived in peace even in mix-villages all over the island, there was not much intermingling: 
Very few mix-marriages took place; both communities had different educational systems and 
background; and the British administration which established itself in 1878 and remained 
until 1960 did very little to radically change it. Under these circumstances it was too much to 
expect that the state set up in accordance with the 1959 and 1960 treaties would overcome all 
these difficulties and bring about a Cypriot identity.4 
After the British took the island's rule from the Ottomans following the 1877-1878 Ottoman -
Russian war in return for British support to the Ottoman Empire against the Russians, the 
Greeks in Cyprus continued to flourish. And the orthodox Greeks started to perceive 
themselves as the majority and the boss over the Turkish community. Emboldened by the 
success of their compatriots in mainland Greece in 1830s, they began to seek ways to unite 
the island with Greece. The policy of Union of Cyprus with Greece, 'enosis', affected the 
attitudes of this Greek orthodox people both towards the Turks and the ruling British 
negatively. Nevertheless, international conditions of that time did not offer much chance to 
the Greeks to achieve their aims, enosis, envisaged in the Megali Idea. The weakness of the 
newly-born Greek state and the global interests of the big powers, Britain, France, and the 
Russians, were not conducive to the realization of enosis throughout the nineteenth century. 
Despite this, the gap betweeen the communities started to widen in this period. Under the 
privileges granted to them by the British rule, the Greeks on the island prospered and 
outweighed the Turks in many respects.5 
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The transfer of legal possession of the island from the Ottomans to Britain in 1914 following 
the Ottoman Empire's decision to join the W.W.I on the side of the Central Powers ended the 
400 years of Ottoman rule on the island. In 1925, Cyprus became a crown colony. One 
development that took place around this time would later become a point of dispute between 
Turkey and Greece was that Turkey relinquished its sovereignty rights in favor of Britain. The 
Turkish government of that time could foresee the developments of 1950s. When the British 
government invited Turkey to the London Conference together with Greece to discuss the 
present situation in 1955, Greece objected to this by claiming that Turkey was not a party to 
the conflict, because she relinquished her sovereignty rights in the Lausanne Peace Treaty. 
However, this was not true altogether because Turkey did relinquish her sovereign rights on 
condition that they would be transferred to Britain. 
Under the British rule from 1925 to 1960, the only aim of the Greeks in Cyprus was to realize 
enosis as soon as possible. The Turkish community did try to preserve its unity and self-
control that was granted by the British. Following the Second World War, a new trend did 
become visible in international relations, de-colonization. When the Greek Cypriots noticed 
that the colonial powers were freeing their dominions and granting them independence, they 
thought that the time for their own independence had arrived. However, the Greeks' definition 
of independence for Cyprus was not in harmony with those of the other colonized nations 
because their aim was enosis rather than independence in the usual way. If they had really 
desired to establish an independent state in association with the Turkish community, the 
century-old owners of the island, all these bloody clashes might have been avoided. 
From the end of the Second World War until 1960, the main goal of the Greek Cypriots was 
first to get rid of the British rule and then to realize enosis. In contrast, both Turkey and the 
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Turkish community on the island were pleased with the British rule and they did not have any 
objection to the continuation of it. However, when they realized that it was impossible to 
preserve the status quo, the best course of action seemed to them to be to divide the island in 
two sections and to secure the lives of the Turkish community from the bloody assaults of the 
Greeks.6 
Following the failed attempts to preserve the status quo, Turkey, Greece and England decided 
to get together and to grant independence to the island under certain constrains in 1960. The 
1960 Agreements established an independent Cyprus state consisting of two sovereign 
entities, the Cypriot Turks and the Greek Cypriots. According to the provisions of the treaties 
that established the independent Cyprus Republic, a 70 to 30 ratio was to be applied in state 
institutions. While the Greek Cypriots would hold 70% of the bureaucratic posts, the Cypriot 
Turks would 30%. The president would be a Greek and the vice-president a Turk. Both 
communities took part in the establishment of the Republic as equal founders. 
In the establishment of the Cyprus Republic, strategic considerations of the western alliance, 
NATO, were of paramount importance. If these two countries which are located very 
strategically, fought each other over Cyprus, this would damage the interests of NATO in the 
region, weakening the firmness of the Alliance against Russia and making the area a suitable 
target for the Soviet Union to extend its influence. It seemed that the interests of Turkey, 
Greece and the United States coincided. However, the sincerity of mother countries regarding 
the preservation of Cyprus's independence did not follow the same track. This was evidenced 
by different courses of actions that Greece and Turkey took in the aftermath of the Greek's 
attempts to alter the newly established status quo to the detriment of the Turkish community 
by relegating them to a minority status in the state. When they, under the leadership of 
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Makarios, tried to revise the constitution by demanding amendments to some articles in 
December, 1963, Turkey and the Turkish community of the island objected to this. Although 
the Greek governments of the time were not openly supporting Makarios, they were 
infiltrating Greek troops to the island in order to strengthen the Greeks' hands against any 
Turkish military action. 
After the withdrawal of the Turks upon the pressure of the Greek Cypriots from the 
government, the Greeks began to control all the state apparatus. From 1964 to 197 4, the main 
aim of the Greeks was to force the Turks, through a very strict economic embargo and 
isolation, to yield to their demands, to accept an enriched minority status and acquiescence to 
a togetherness in a state dominated by the Greeks. When the colonels regime in Athens 
initiated a coup against Makarios, who was seen by the colonels as the man preventing the 
unification of the island with mainland Greece, and replaced him with Nicos Sampson in 
order to achieve enosis, Turkey intervened militarily and divided the island into a de facto two 
sections.7 
From 1963 until now, these two people have been living separately under the rule of their 
own authorities. First, the establishment of"Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" in 1975, and 
then of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" in 1983 are the indications of the Turkish 
community's will to live under an authority controlled by themselves.8 
Since 1974, the leaders of both communities met many times to discuss possible ways for 
solution. In this respect, two meetings of the communal leaders are really important. "The 
Four Guidelines Agreement" between Denkta~ and Makarios in February, 1977, and the "Ten 
Points Agreement" between Denkta~ and Kyprianou in May, 1979, fixed the basic principles 
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of a solution process. Since then, the main target of the parties has been the realization of a 
federal republic which would consist of two bi-zonal communities which would rule their 
own people in their sections but unite under the title of a federal Cyprus Republic. 9 Although 
both communities agreed to the idea of federalism as the structure of the state, they could not 
come to a compromise, because their definitions of federalism differed too much from each 
other. 
While the Turkish side has always desired the establishment of a federal state which would 
consist of two bi-communal and bi-zonal entities, the continuation of Turkey's security 
guarantee envisaged by the 1960 treaties, and the full recognition of TRNC as a precondition 
to establish the federal state, the Greek side has sought the establishment of a federal state 
which would have only one sovereignty, the abolition of Turkey's guarantees, and the 
assignment of improved minority rights to the Turkish community in the new state. In terms 
of their federation definitions, one thing is very significant. While the Turks rejected the 
assignment of "traveling, settlement and owning property" rights to the Greek community, the 
Greeks appear to see them as a major part of the negotiation process. The net result of these 
protracted negotiations is a deadlock. If the Turkish community on the island did not object to 
the realization of these rights from the beginning, the whole island would become a Greek 
state where the Greek community would dominate the Turkish community not only 
economically but also politically and socially. The relatively better-off positions of the Greeks 
over the Turks would lead the Greeks to buy Turkish lands and to return to the Turkish 
territories in the north that they had to leave following Turkey's 1974 military intervention. 
The Greeks' efforts to get back to the North display their will of making the whole island a 
Greek Cypriot state, under the disguise of a federation. 
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Regarding the position of the third parties m the solution process, it seems that their 
involvement did not help the parties settle the problems. Instead it is safe to say that they 
provoked the parties to adhere to their established arguments more rigidly, and to ignore the 
ideas of the other side. The reasons why the involvement of the third parties could not create a 
suitable atmosphere conducive to solution lie in the motives behind their actions. 
The first misconception by third parties which makes things complicated has been their 
insistence that there is only one legal entity on the island, the Greek State. In other words, 
their objection to the recognition of TRNC as a legal state representing the Turkish 
community has hindered the solution process because it was illogical on the part of third 
parties to exhort the communities on the island to establish a federation, while denying 
recognition to the TRNC. In addition, while the third parties insisted on calling the Greek 
leaders as "the President", they prefer to address the leader of the TR..'l\TC as "Mr. Denkta~". 
This sort of an attitude has obviously emboldened the Greek Cypriots to chose intransigence 
in the solution process by not yielding to any Turkish proposal. As the alleged legal owners of 
the island, the Greeks appear to think that if the international community continue to 
recognize them as the only legal authority on the island, they do not need to share this 
authority with the Turks in a federation because it is better to be in sole possession of it. Since 
the Greek Cypriots were recognized as the only authority from the beginning, all the attempts 
to find a solution to the problem centered around the idea of how to get the Turkish side to 
come close to Greek views. 
In the solution process, the Greek Cypriot' application for the EU membership and the 
acceptance of it by the Union in 1995 became a turning point in terms of the changes in Greek 
side's approach towards a federal solution. From 1974 to 1990, the Greeks appeared to 
29 
support a federation as a possible way to settle the dispute. However, from the 1990s onwards 
they changed their views and initiated attempts to become a member of the EU. The EU 
membership seemed to them to be as the shortest way of achieving full control over the island 
and getting a de facto enosis with Greece. When they understood that it was futile to force the 
Turkish community to yield to a state structure under the Greek Cypriot control, they began to 
seek ways of becoming an EU member. However, they did not stop the process of 
intercommunal talks between the leaders of both communities, keeping in mind that if they 
locked this process, the world community might have concluded that it was the Greeks which 
hindered the solution. 10 
The recognition of the Greek State as the sole authority on the island gained significance once 
again following the decision of the EU to start the membership process with the Greek State 
in May, 1998. Although this decision of the Union would not mean that the Greek Cypriots 
will surely be taken in the Club, the very existence of such an hope at the back of the minds of 
the Greeks would be enough for them not to accept any federal solution in which they would 
have to share the sovereignty with the Turks. 
As is obvious that the involvement of the EU is not helping the parties solve their problems, 
the use of other international platforms, like NATO, might be made more use of in this 
process. Because the main reason of the current situation is the lack of confidence between 
the communities, the attempts at filling this gap should be the major priority. In this regard, 
the parties should be encouraged to work in common international institutions. Thus, NATO 
appears to be the most capable platform that might bring these communities together and help 
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them eradicate the walls of misunderstanding. In addition to such sort of benefits that the 
communities on the island would get from NATO involvement, the existing strategic balance 
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between Turkey and Greece would also be preserved. The details of a NATO involvement in 
the Solution of Cyprus dispute is being discussed in the fifth chapter. 
The involvement of the EU in the solution has not only locked the intercommunal talks on the 
island, but also estranged Turkey's relations with the Union. A possible membership of the 
Greek Cypriot Republic in the EU which recognises the Greek Cypriot government as the sole 
authority having full sovereignty over the island would automatically mean that the TRNC 
would seemingly be included in the EU as well. In case of Cyprus's membership into the EU 
Turkey will integrate TRNC to Turkey as it was made obvious in the treaties between Turkey 
and TRNC lately. 
2. Aegean Sea Related Problems: 
In this section, causes of problems that bring Turkey and Greece to a collision course in the 
Aegean Sea will be analyzed. Although this region has been host to both these countries for 
centuries and witnessed many historical events that these nations experienced, it has not been 
an area of peace and cooperation for a long time. In this respect, the existence of one trend 
seems very interesting as to why Turkey and Greece could not create a peaceful atmosphere in 
the twentieth century. It is interesting to note that the emergence of Aegean Sea problems 
coincides more or less with the nation state building process in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries particularly in Greece. When Greece became independent, it attained the 
concoiscence of ownership regarding the Aegean Sea. Stemming from the existence of 
nationalistic ideologies in Greece, the Greek people attributed very significant value to this 
Sea, and somehow they thought that this region does exclusively belong to them, and that the 
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other state, namely Turkey, constitutes an obstacle before the expansion of their interests in 
the Aegean. 
For example, the significant role of the "Megali Idea" concept in the formation of the modem 
Greek nation played a determining role in the emergence of Greek claims with respect to the 
Aegean Sea. One of the components of the Megali Idea relates to that Sea by putting it as an 
inevitable living space for the Greek people. According to them, the Ottomans captured these 
areas and hampered the territorial integrity of the people of Greek origin by forcing them to 
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live separated from each other. Therefore, the fulfillment of complete Greek domination over 
the Aegean Sea is very logical and right. On the other hand, Turkey does not claim that the 
Aegean Sea only belongs to Turkey and Greece does not have any right to question Turkey's 
sovereignty there. Instead, Ankara seems to share certain deposits under the seabed and wants 
to have unhindered navigational access to its military and maritime ships. The emergence of 
the Sea as an economically valuable area in the post W.W.II era increased the importance of 
the Aegean Sea in bilateral relations. The discovery of oil resources under the seabed led 
these nations to a collision course as to how they can posses as much of the area as possible. 
The question of sovereignty became the underlying reason of many current problems. 
With the advent of the Cyprus dispute, the Turco-Greek differences over the Aegean Sea 
became more and more complicated. Indeed, it was perhaps the Cyprus issue which made the 
Aegean dispute break the surface in the first place. That is not to say, however, that the 
Aegean disputes are now a secondary matter in the overall Turco-Greek conflict. If anything, 
it has become so intense and complicated that it brought the two countries to the brink of a 
full-scale war several times, and that it might at any time cause tension and even armed clash. 
In other words, the Cyprus issue and the Aegean disputes have their own dynamics, and each 
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case needs to be examined and possibly resolved on its own merit. Nonetheless, close 
relationship between them is obvious. 
2.1. The Continental Shelf Dispute: 
Among the Aegean Problems, the continental shelf dispute holds the most important place 
owing to its close connection with other problems. The technological developments of the 
1970s increased the value of the Aegean Sea in the eyes of Greece and Turkey by giving rise 
to hopes that they could extract oil from the seabed. When they realized that the Aegean Sea 
bed contains oil resources, they made the delimitation of the frontiers between themselves an 
important priority. The problems associated with the continental shelf areas in the Aegean Sea 
are twofold. While, on the one hand, the littoral countries cannot agree on how to delimit the 
continental shelf, they are also in conflict with respect to possible ways of solution of the 
problem. 
The Turkish government maintains that the Aegean Sea has some sui generis special features. 
The fact that it is a semi-closed sea with many islands and islets scattered all around, the 
regulations of the 1958 and 1982 Conventions on the Law of the Sea cannot be applied here. 
The Greek governments on the other hand base their arguments on these treaties because 
according to the regulations of these conventions, all the islands together with the Greek 
mainland have their own continental shelves. Being aware that there are more than 2000 
Greek islands, islets, rocks and other geographical formations in the Aegean Sea, one can 
easily comprehend Greece's possible gains if the regulations of these conventions were strictly 
applied here. 
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Therefore, Turkey proposes a median line in the middle of the Aegean Sea that would divide 
the continental shelf in nearly two equal parts. Greece, on her part, suggests drawing a line 
between the mainland Turkey and her Easternmost Aegean Islands, giving Turkey a very 
small share. The Greek government bases her argument on the 6th article of the 1958 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, according to which if the littoral countries can not delimit 
her continental shelves through negotiations, the "equi-distance principle" is applied in 
delimitation. The Greek government also claims that her eastern Aegean islands are the 
natural and lega1£xtension of her sovereignty, and, therefore, no one can make a distinction 
between mainland Greece and her Eastern Aegean Islands. These islands are within the 
territorial integrity of Greece. In contrast, Turkey says that the "natural prolongation 
principle" should be applied with respect to these islands; these islands lie within the natural 
prolongation of mainland Turkey, and the resources under the seabed of these islands should 
belong to Turkey. Turkey also says that the "equity principle" is also applicable here in 
delimitation of the continental shelf, envisaged by the Article 300 of the 1982 Conventions on 
the Law of the Sea. Overall the Turkish view is based on the basic principle of the Lausanne 
Peace Treaty which created some balance between these two countries. 11 
Besides these substance-related problems, these countries have also been at odds with each 
other with respect to the ways of a solution. While Turkey supports the idea of direct 
negotiations between the parties as a major means of solution, Greece favors a solution 
reached through international law and courts. In this regard, the application of the Greek 
government of Kararmanlis to the International Court of Justice in the Hague in 1976, and the 
decision of that court in 1978 is illuminating regarding the feasibility of any judicial solution, 
because the Court decided that it was not a competent institution to handle the issues in the 
absence of Turkey unless both countries came to the Court together. Like the international 
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Court of Justice, the United Nations Security Council issued a resolution, upon the application 
of Greece in 1976, stating that the parties should first try to negotiate, and then, if they could 
not reach a compromise, should use the judicial and arbitration mechanism, including the 
International Court of Justice. 
Although the stance of the international community was somehow neutral towards this 
problem, the membership of Greece to the EU tipped the balance in favour of Greece as the 
Union somehow became .. a defender of Greece's claims against Turkey because of the 
consensus upon which the Union functions. 
2.2 Territorial Waters: 
The emergence of the territorial waters as a dispute between Greece and Turkey coincides 
with the signing of 1982 International Convention on the Law of the Sea by Greece but not by 
Turkey. According to the Article 3 of this conventions, littoral states have the right to extend 
their territorial waters up to 12 miles. Being a signatory to this Convention, Greece claims 
that she has the right to implement this article in the Aegean whenever she sees fit. Turkey 
vehemently objects to that on the grounds, that If Greece extends her territorial waters to 12 
miles, Turkey's share of territorial waters would decrease automatically and that much of the 
Aegean Sea would go to Greece, making the Aegean a Greek lake. Being a littoral country on 
the Aegean Sea, and aware of the importance of that Sea for her navigation, both military and 
commercial, Turkey strongly opposes Greece's extension of territorial waters beyond the 
current 6 miles. 
In the Lausanne Peace Treaty both countries agreed on a 3 miles limit of territorial waters. 
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Later in 1936, Greece extended her territorial waters to 6 miles, and Turkey reciprocated to 
this by extending her territorial waters to 6 miles in 1964. Under the 6 miles limits, Turkey 
possesses 7.47% and Greece possesses 43.68% of the Aegean Sea, while the international 
waters consist of 48.85% of that Sea. In case Greece and Turkey extend their territorial waters 
to 12 miles, Greece's share will increase to 73%, and Turkey's share will go from the present 
7.47% to 8.76%, while the international waters will drop to 15% of all the waters. 12 
As these figures indicate, an extension of territorial waters to12 miles would only benefit 
Greece at the expense of Turkey and the international community. Likewise in the continental 
shelf dispute, while Turkey suggests the use of bilateral negotiations as the proper way of 
solution, Greece favors resorting to judicial and arbitrary mechanisms. Turkey puts forth the 
article 300 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea to prevent Greece from extending her 
territorial waters beyond 6 miles to the detriment of their neighbors in abuse of this right. 13 
On the contrary, Greece, by citing the principle of "national integrity", claims that her eastern 
Aegean Islands should also benefit this 12 mile extension. In such a case, the Turkish vessels 
would need to take the Greek government permission to pass through these waters. For 
instance, a Turkish ferryboat that will depaf from Mersin to go to Istanbul would need to ask 
Greece's permission to pass through the Greek waters to reach its destination. 
2.3. Air Space Problem: 
This problem is related to the limit of territorial waters; a country cannot possess an air space 
that extends her territorial waters. This principle was regulated by the Chicago Convention in 
1944.14 Although this rule has been respected by many countries in the world, Greece denies 
the existence of such a rule and claims that her air zones is 10 miles. Greece bases her claims 
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on a presidential (royal at that time) decree issued in 1931. Although this decree was issued in 
1931, the Greek governments did not bring this to the attention of the international 
community in general, and Turkey, in particular. When the then Greek government 
announced in 1975 that Greece had an air zone of 10 miles, Turkey objected to this harshly by 
referring to articles of 1944 Chicago Connection regulating this issue. 
The significance of the air zone problem takes place when the Greek governments accuse 
Turkey and other countries of violating her air zones. During the Turkish military exercises 
over the Aegean Sea, the Turkish aircraft do not take the alleged 10 miles of Greece's air 
zones into consideration and fly over the 4 miles of air zone outside Greece's 6 miles of air 
space. Turkey recognizes that Greece has only a 6 miles air zone that corresponds to Greece's 
-6 miles territorial waters. Besides Turkey, the US and other countries do not also accept a 10 
miles Greek air zone, and behave like Turkey during the NATO's military exercises over the 
Aegean Sea. 15 
2.4. FIR (Flight Information Region) Problem: 
The region in which the responsible country regulates the civil aviation activities and provides 
the countries with flight information and performs search-rescue activities is called flight 
information region. The boundaries of these regions are approved by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO). Although these regions do not give the responsible countries 
any right of sovereignty over these boundaries, the Greek governments deem the frontiers of 
these flight information regions as their national air space. The present frontiers of flight 
information regions over the Aegean Sea were determined by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization in 1950 and 1958 meetings. Today's frontiers of FIR over the Aegean Sea 
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correspond to Greece's and Turkey's outer limits of territorial waters. Turkey and Greece are 
responsible for the regulation of civil aviation activities over their territorial waters. 
In the essence of the conflict lies the Greek demand that all Turkish aircraft have to inform the 
Greek authorities when they are entering the Athens Flight Information Region. However, 
Turkeys rejects such demands on the grounds, that these regions were organized just to 
regulate civil aviation. Turkey informs the Greek authorities of the flights of Turkish civil 
planes, but deny giving flight information with respect to military flights. According to 
Turkey, military flights should be organized through bilateral negotiations between Turkey 
and Greece. 16 
2.5. Militarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands: 
The islands which Greece possesses off a few miles away from the Turkish coast constitute 
one of the thorny problems between Greece and Turkey owing to the attempts of Greece to 
abolish the demilitarized status of them. 
The demilitarized status of these islands were first decided by the 1913 London Treaty, and 
then the declarations of the six European countries to the Greek government in February, 
1914. 17 The Lausanne Treaty that ended the war between Turkey and Greece reiterated the 
demilitarized status of these eastern Aegean islands. 18 In addition to the Lausanne Treaty, the 
status of the Straits and the islands at the entrance of the straits were fixed in an additional 
protocol to the Lausanne Treaty in which the demilitarized status of those islands were stated 
openly. 19 The 1936 Mountreax Convention on the status of the Straits and the islands lying 
before the Straits were regulated according to the security needs of Turkey and there did not 
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occur any changes about the demilitarised status of the islands that Greece owns before the 
Straits.20 Besides this, the 1947 Paris Peace Agreement that was signed between Greece and 
Italy confirmed the demilitarised status of the Dodacanese islands.21 
Despite the existence of legal grounds, the Greek governments started to militarize these 
islands in the 1960s. The interesting point in the timing of the Greek government to initiate its 
militarization process of these islands is the fact that Greece did state to change the 
established status of these islands concomitantly with the developments of the Cyprus dispute. 
Until the 1960s, the Greek governments abided by demilitarised status of the islands. When 
the Turkish Government presented its first warning to Greece in 1964, due to the allegations 
that Greece was fortifying Rhodes and Istankoy islands, Greece responded by saying that she 
was continuing to abide by the regulations of the aforementioned treaties concerning the 
status of these islands. Interestingly, starting with the 1970s, the Greek governments changed 
their attitudes towards Turkey's allegations that Greece was trying to militarize these islands. 
The showcase that displays the changes in Greece's approach to this issue took place in the 
militarization of the Lemnos Island by Greece. To the warnings of Turkey, Greece responded 
that, for the first time, the 1936 Montrioux Convention gave her the right to militarize this 
island. In her efforts to change the status quo of the aforementioned treaties concerning these 
islands, Greece has been using the NATO mechanisms to get Turkey to accept invalidity of 
these treaties. 
For example, the Greek governments have tried to have NATO include the Lemnos Island in 
the military exercises in the Aegean Sea, realising their aims through the back door. However, 
the NATO countries hesitated to side with one of the parties to the conflict and avoided 
themselves being involved in the bilateral problems between Turkey and Greece. NA TO did 
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not include the Lemnos Island in its maneuvers in the Aegean Sea. This attitude of NATO 
brought about two different evaluations in Turkey and Greece. While Turkey applauding the 
position of NATO in preserving its impartiality, the Greek government deemed the NATO 
action as being in favour of Turkey. Greece's perception of NATO's status regarding the 
Lemnos Island later played a role in the emergence of a hostile attitude towards NATO in 
Greece. Whenever the US, the leading country of NATO, has proposed that the parties should 
negotiate the existing problems in order to find solutions to them, Greece has suspected of 
these propositions, thinking that the US is acting in favor of Turkey. 
To the objections of Turkey concerning the status of the Eastern Aegean Islands, the Greek 
governments put forth some arguments in order to justify their actions on these islands. As far 
as the Lemnos and Semotharace islands are concerned, the Greek governments claim that the 
nonmilitarized status of those islands was changed by the 1936 Montreux Convention. In this 
respect, there is not any consistent evaluation about the status of these islands. Many Turkish 
international lawyers state that the Montreux Convention only redefined the status of the 
Straits and the islands that Turkey possesses before the straits, by conferring Turkey the right 
to arm these regions. On the other hand the majority of the Greek specialists state the opposite 
that the Montreux Convention replaced the Lausanne Peace Treaty with respect to the clauses 
of the latter about the straits and the islands in its vicinity. They claim that the Montreux 
Convention gave Greece the right to arm these islands as well. 
As of the Eastern Aegean Islands, the Greek governments adheres to the UN Charter, 
especially the article 51, by stating that this article gives Greece to defend itself. Greece refers 
to the formation of the Aegean Army by Turkey, and says that she is arming those islands just 
for self-defense. Oddly enough, the Aegean Army was established by Turkey long after the 
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Greek governments had begun to milita.rize these islands. With respect to the status of the 
Dodecanese Islands, Greece reminds Turkey that the Paris Treaty of 194 7 was signed between 
Greece and Italy, and since Turkey was not a party to this treaty, she has no right to criticise 
the status of these islands. 
2.6. The Early Warnings and Command and Control Responsibilities Problems: 
These two problems related to the responsibilities of Greece and Turkey within NATO are 
very much interrelated. The essence of the conflict lies in the attempts of the parties, 
especially of Greece, to control much of the region. The situation prior to the 197 4 Cyprus 
crisis was very much to the advantage of Greece, enabling her to extend her air and naval 
control up to the outer limits of Turkey's territorial waters. The dangers of these regulations 
for Turkey came about during the 1974 Cyprus Crisis. The Turkish governments thought that 
if Greece continued to hold the command and control responsibilities in the region according 
to the regulations of NATO, Turkey might not have enough time to take counter measures in 
case of an air attack by Greece. 
After the withdrawal of Greece from the military wing of NATO in the aftermath of the 197 4 
Cyprus Crisis, Turkey made it clear that the regulation prior to 197 4 was no longer valid, and 
if Greece wanted to rejoin NATO, she would have to re-negotiate the aforementioned 
responsibilities with Turkey. Bearing the hopes of advantageous regulations in mind, the 
military regime in Turkey gave its consent to Greece's entrance to NATO in 1980. Although, 
the parties agreed to negotiate these problems after Greece joined NATO through the Rogers 
Agreement, there has been no negotiation between the two since then. 22 
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The problems related with the command and control responsibilities in the Aegean Sea will be 
discussed in the fourth chapter in detail. 
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CHAPTER 4: GREECE AND TURKEY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
NATO FRAMEWORK 
Main thesis of the present work regarding the international organizations to which both 
Greece and Turkey are attached either through full membership or a special status is that 
these countries have tried to mobilize these bodies against each other. Here an attempt 
will be made to analyze this process by focusing on the two most important 
organizations, i.e. NATO and the European Union. The reason why these organizations 
are chosen as a main area of focus lies in the fact that these are the main channels that 
link these countries to the western world, and that they provided Turkey and Greece with 
the tools to cope with security, economic, and political challenges of the Cold War and 
after. 
In the analysis of the subject regarding NATO, the year 1952, when Greece and Turkey 
became members, should be taken as the starting point. As far as the EU is concerned, the 
year 197 4 will be the main date to emphasize. Although neither Greece nor Turkey had 
by then attained the membership status in 1974, that year signifies a departure point in 
Greece's history as she left the military wing of NATO and gravitated towards the 
European Community. The same year, 1974, confirmed Turkey's superiority to Greece 
not only in a single-handed war but also within the NATO platforms. Until Greece's 
return to NATO in 1981, Turkey enjoyed a privileged status in the region. 
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While highlighting the major tactics of these two countries in the process of utilization of 
these international organizations, the main task of the present study is to prove the futility 
of their endeavors and to display the prospected benefits and gains that the countries 
might have made if they had used the mechanisms of the institutions for solution of their 
bilateral problems. 
4.1 The European Union Context 
After the end of the World War II, the US government initiated an aid program for the 
western European countries to help them recover from the ruins of the devastating war. 
Since the US was the only country capable of providing such magnanimous help, it was 
logical to derive that the new international order of post war was shaped under the 
American influence. The Americans were helping their European partners come together 
and unite for common grounds in order to get over the war's trauma. Signed in 1957 the 
Rome Treaty leading to the establishment of the European Union -then the European 
Community- was an important landmark in the process of European integration. 1 
Although this organization was not a body providing its members with security 
guarantees, it served the function of bringing them together through economic incentives. 
The western European countries could find time and opportunity to cooperate through 
this organization under the climate of security provided by the other major institution of 
the western world, NATO. 
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Although Greece and Turkey secured their membership in NATO in 1952, they had 
further concerns. They continued to seek other grounds to anchor themselves to the 
western world. Establishment of the EC offered these counties an opportunity. Two years 
after the foundation of the community both Greece and Turkey applied for the associate 
membership. In fact the Turkish foreign policy-makers of that time were perceiving the 
possible membership in the EC as an important milestone in their century-old 
Europeanization policy. According to them, membership in the community was a logical 
and reasonable derivation of being a member in the western alliance.2 
This was also the case in Greece. Greek foreign policy-makers were searching possible 
ways to attach themselves to the western community more firmly. As to the time of 
Turkey's application for associate membership, some circles in Turkey are voicing that 
Turkey did this just because the Greek government applied two months before, and 
according to them, if Turkey had missed this chance she would have lagged behind 
Greece in the context of Europeannes, and Turkey would have lost the chance of 
maintaining the balance with Greece. In other words, Greece might have mobilized the 
EU, as she does now, against Turkey in the absence of Turkey's membership.3 Although 
the latest developments of 1980s and 1990s have proven these arguments right, it was an 
easy way to try to explain the foreign policy motives of Turkey in the context of her 
relations with Greece because nobody might have expected the developments of today. 
Moreover both countries had not been experiencing troubling problems during that time. 
If anything, they were cooperating inside NATO and the Balkan Pact. 
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Regarding the attitudes of the EC towards their applications for associate membership, 
one might say that the main points of considerations that the community took into 
account were security and military-related ones. While the world was living through the 
horrors of the cold war in extreme in 1950s, the community was evaluating the 
application of Greece and Turkey on their capabilities to contribute to the overall 
European security and alliance. The significance of this security considerations was 
reflected into the texts of the association agreements that the community signed with 
Greece and Turkey in which the community was offering full membership to both of 
them after a fixed period of time. This kind of a clause was not put inside the association 
agreements that the community signed with the other countries.4 
Since the inception of the association agreements with both Greece and Turkey in 1961 
and 1963 respectively until the beginning of 1970s, the relations between the community 
and these NATO allies were largely shaped by the realities of the cold war. In a broader 
sense, the main points of considerations were security and military related. However, 
with the beginning of the "detente" in the superpower relations, the other considerations 
began to gain significance in these relations. Economic motives started to characterize the 
relations between the community and these two countries. This was due to the emergence 
of the first discrepancies between the US and its European partners. As the European 
countries were recovering economically, their dependence upon the US was 
automatically decreasing, and this led to the emergence of chasms in the western 
Aliance. 5 These developments caused the emergence of a belief in the European circles 
that as long as both Greece and Turkey could not achieve structural changes in their 
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economies and thus develop, their strategic contributions to the western security would 
not suffice for their full membership. In light of these new arguments, the years of 1970s 
were really full of interesting events. While the Greek government of veteran politician 
Konstantin Karamanlis applied for the full membership and speeded up the process of 
structural changes in Greece's economy, the circles in Turkey ranging from politicians to 
business circles were quite busy with debates on the customs union. In other words, while 
the Turkish governments of the time were freezing their relations with the community 
due to the difficulties of economic adjustment programs that were necessary for the 
realization of the Customs Union, the Greek government did not see the customs union 
sufficient and applied for full membership instead. 6 
As to the reasons of Greece's application for full membership to the community, one 
should note that the Cyprus developments of 1974 and the overall American attitude 
towards these developments affected the circles of foreign policy decision-making 
process. When the newly established Karamanlis government came to the conclusion that 
NATO did nothing to prevent Turkey from landing on Cyprus, partitioning the island de 
facto in two separate entities, the most preferable foreign policy course seemed to quit 
NATO, not only to protest the US but also to calm down the anger and frustration of the 
Greek people. In fact, the process of deterioration of NATO's, namely the US' credibility 
in the eyes of the Greek people dates back to 1967 when the American government of 
that time pressured Greece to withdraw her troops, 15 thousand, from Cyprus in order to 
calm down the Gecitkale Crisis and an eventual military confrontation between Greece 
and Turkey. In addition, the Greeks believe that the success of the military to grasp 
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power and abolish democracy in 1967 emanates from the covert support of the American 
government of the time. They further claim that the Americans emboldened General 
Ionnanides of Greece to oust the intransigent president of Greek Cyprus Government, 
Makarios, from office, accelerating the process of enosis. Upon the emergence of such 
sort of beliefs and perceptions in Greek public opinion with respect to NATO and the US, 
the Karamanlis government started to look for other possible foreign policy alternatives 
to decrease Greece's dependence on the US. Within the general framework of 
"multidimensional foreign policy" Greece applied for membership in the Community. 
Besides, the Greek government tried to improve her relations with the Soviet Union and 
the other communist block countries, as well as the Middle Eastern Arabic counties. 7 
As far as the attitude of the EC towards the bilateral disputes between Greece and Turkey 
is concerned, one might say that until the Greek membership in 1981, the Community 
pursued a "hands-off' policy.8 This was because of the lack of conunon foreign policy 
mechanisms within the Community. Although "the Common Security Policy Program" 
started in 1973 with the aim of harmonizing the respective foreign policy courses of the 
member states , the community could not succeed in formulating and implementing a 
common course in foreign policy; instead each member followed her way.9 Each member 
state pursued her policy independently of the other members. In this, the difficulty of 
converging the interests of the community members rank first. The important point in the 
hands-off policy was not the lack of member states to follow a conunon course regarding 
Turco-Greek disputes but rather their failure in implementing a constructive approach to 
these problems. Like NATO and the US, their first priority became the confinement of a 
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possible flame-up between Greece and Turkey to low levels and the prevention of a 
military confrontation that might have disrupted the western security structure. 
But after Greece's membership in the community, this hands-off policy began to change 
to the detriment of Turkey. The Greek governments tried to use the mechanisms of the 
Community to force Turkey to yield to Greek demands in the solution process of bilateral 
disputes. Having realized that Turkey aspired to join this Club at whatever cost, the 
Greek governments initiated a policy of "conditionality" according to which Turkey 
would have given Greece all the latter wanted. 10 Although this is the stance of Greece 
with respect to Turkey, the EC did not follow a completely pro-Greek course. Yet, this 
has started to change especially after the dissolution of the communist block and the 
evaporation of the Cold War. All this has reduced the strategic value of Turkey in Europe 
and thus encouraged the Union to take a more Grekophile attitude towards Turkey. 
The clear evidence of changes ofEC/EU's attitudes towards Turkey might be seen in the 
decisions of the community's organs about Turkey's membership prospects. Although 
the Community was reiterating the economic, democratic, cultural, politic, and human 
rights problems of Turkey among the reasons for not letting her in, it added her problems 
with Greece to the list. This was evidenced in the report of the EC evaluating Turkey's 
application in 1987. The Dublin Summit of the Community leaders in June 1990 clarified 
the fact that if Turkey wanted to be a member, she had to make concessions to Greece. 11 
This was putting the Community's relations with Turkey under the Greek mortgage. The 
use of the Union by Greece against Turkey took place also during the negotiations 
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regarding the realizations of the fourth financial program envisaged within the framework 
of the Customs Union. Due to the Greek veto, Turkey has not been receiving 600 million-
dollar aid since 1981.12 
There are several instances on which Greece successfully mobilized the Union against 
Turkey. For example, in 1995 Turkey could sign a customs union agreement with the EU 
only after the Greek government recast her veto on it. And, on the face of the Greek veto 
it was not so easy for Turkey to realize this agreement because Ankara had to give up its 
objections to the start of the negotiation process of the Greek Cyprus Republic with the 
Union for her membership. Because the Turkish government gives utmost importance to 
relations with the EU, they evaluated the Customs Union agreement as an important step 
in the process of being accepted as a member. The Greek assumption was that Greece did 
not have to do so much to earn concessions from Turkey since Turkey was so eager and 
blind to do everything to integrate with the Union that she might easily give up her 
established stand with respect to problems with Greece. 
One other example of the use of the Union by Greece against Turkey might be discerned 
in the decisions of the European Union Commission concerning Turkey's membership 
possibilities. In one of them it was openly stated that so long as the Turkish troops 
remained in Cyprus, and there occurred no settlement on the island, Turkey could not join 
the Union. It is a clear projection of Greece's argument in the documents of the Union 
that if.Turkey does not withdraw her troops from the island, Greece will not negotiate any 
existing problems with Turkey. 13 The latest and well-known showcase of the European 
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Union's involvement in Turco-Greek disputes, on the side of Greece, came out in the 
decision of the Union that it would start the membership negotiation with the Greek 
Cyprus Republic in the first half of 1998. In this regard~ one might ask why the EU 
supports Greece's stance or approach in its relations with Turkey. In other words, why 
does the European Union support Greece's policies or arguments against Turkey? 
The answer to this question lies in the mechanism of "trade-off of files" inside the Union. 
This enables Greece to have the Union endorse her arguments. Despite the fact that 
Greece does not have the capability and potential of determining the decisions of the 
Union, other countries have to somehow take the Greek interests into consideration, since 
they need Greece's vote for the realization of their own policies. 14 For example, the fact 
that Greece is blackmailing the enlargement of the EU should the EU refuse to start the 
membership process with the Greek Cyprus Republic is a very cheap and somehow "cost 
free" course of action for her. Therefore, the Greek governments do not negotiate the 
points at issue with Turkey, knowing clearly that, if they do, they would have to make 
concessions to Ankara. In broader terms, a Turkey which stands in front of the Union's 
door and displays all signs of willingness to make concessions in return for membership 
has encouraged Greece to follow the aforementioned cost free policy against Turkey. 
Existence of this sort of a policy was proved by the explanations of the Greek politicians 
in the aftermath of the meeting of the conservative party leaders of the EU in Brussels in 
March of 1997. It was stated in that meeting that because Turkey had a religion and 
cultural traditions different from the EU countries, it is difficult and somehow impossible 
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for her to join the Club. Greece was quick to utter that it was not Greece, in contrast to 
the general belief, but the other countries of the Union that blocked Turkey's 
membership. Following these events many important figures in the Greek government 
made speeches about whether Turkey belonged to Europe or had a right to join this club 
or not. They even went further by stating that Turkey was linked to the continent both 
through her Ottoman past and her contemporary relations, and that Greece had supported 
the membership of Turkey and would continue to do so in the future as well. 15 
The motives behind these explanations might be various, but the most important among 
them is the fear on the part of the Greek side, that if Turkey turned her back to the EU 
and ceased its enthusiastic search for membership in this Club, Greece would 
automatically lose her leverage with, or trump card, against Turkey. Second, a Turkey 
who is estranged from Europe and turned to other directions, especially east, might be 
more harmful for Greece's interests, because such a Turkey might be more intransigent in 
the solution process of the problems.16 Third, Greece might encounter with the same 
problems of Turkey, should these arguments over different religion and culture become 
prevalent in the EU circles, since Greece is the only orthodox country in the Club and 
seen different by many in the EU. Because Greece's historical, religious and cultural 
traditions are much different from the other EU members, it might be likely that the latter 
might not want to see Greece in their family environment, particularly at a time when 
these views are gaining ground all over the world. Especially, after the. famous social 
scientist Samuel Huntington noted in his article that NATO should not enlarge to other 
European countries whose past and present were totally divergent from the western 
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Europe, there has been intensive debate on the clash of civilizations and possible 
disintegration of the contemporary international system or redelimitation of territorial 
borders on the basis of cultural differences. 
Being cognizant of the dangers of cultural discriminations of the EU against Turkey, 
Greece fears that the EU or other western institutions, like NATO, might consider 
pushing her out of these clubs, because she is orthodox and therefore, not from the same 
historical and cultural roots as the western Europe. 17 Last, the Greek government might 
have thought that if Turkey perceived that Greece was working for her membership in the 
EU, she might probably yield to Greek demands in the solution process. 18 These possible 
reasons that explain the sudden changes in Greece's foreign policy towards Turkey, 
might be wrong. However, as the latest trends in Greece, especially among the 
intellectuals, display the Greek government is being exhorted to use the EU mechanisms 
as far as Turkey is concerned. This might be noticed in the reports of some of think-
thanks to the Greek government, that Greece should continue to support Turkey's 
membership in the Union, because this is the only way to get concessions from Turkey in 
the near future, given Turkey is willingness to join the EU. 19 
After the declarations of the summit held in Luxembourg on December 12, 1997, the pro-
Greek disposition of the EU became quite apparent. In that meeting the Union made it 
clear that Turkey could not become a full member, as long as she did not display a 
"constructive attitude" towards the solution of Cyprus and the Aegean problems. By 
constructive, they meant that Turkey should accept the compatibility of the International 
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Court of Justice in the Hague, and make concessions to Greece by withdrawing her 
troops from Cyprus and giving up her objections to the membership talks of the island 
planned to start in May, 1998.20 In the Luxemburg meeting, "the non-inclusion of 
Turkey, which in 1995 agreed to a customs union with the EU, came about as the 
European leaders prepared to invite six countries to begin negotiations for EU 
membership, a process that will take years. These countries are Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus. In addition, five other countries --
Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria -- are considered second-tier countries 
with whom negations will begin later."21 Besides the other reasons of the Union to reject 
Turkey's membership application, the fact that her problems with Greece has been stated 
openly as the most important causes of the impossibility of her membership at least in the 
next 15 years, marks the partial and biased attitude of the Union towards Turkey. The 
decisions of this Luxembourg Summit are not the only ones that are pro-Greek. For 
example, the decision of the EU Commission that the Imia/Kardak Dispute should be 
submitted to International Court of Justice in the Hague is another example.22 
The fact that Greece has been trying to keep Turkey at the door of the Union, and to this 
end, seemingly supporting Turkey's right to enter the EU contradicts with the behaviors 
of the Greek government prior to the Luxembourg summit of the EU leaders on the 
enlargement of the Union. Because the Greek government relies on the EU for the 
solution of her problems with Turkey, the emergence of a Turkey that has distanced itself 
from the EU and does not pursue policies to join Club any more is bound to make the 
solution of the disputes with Greece in the way Athens wants very difficult in the near 
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future. The end of Turkey's aspirations to join the EU at whatever cost would definitely 
damage Greece's hope to get concessions from Turkey.23 
In this regard, the question to be asked is why the EU makes the entry of Turkey 
contingent on her attitude towards Greece, forcing Ankara to give in to the Greek 
demands by accepting compatibility of the International Court of Justice in Hague, and 
giving priority to judicial and arbitral mechanisms in the solution process of the bilateral 
problems. It seems that the EU advocates Turkey's membership prospect just on 
economic, political, and social grounds, excluding strategic aspects. This makes the 
major difference between the EU and the US vis-a-vis their approaches towards Turkey. 
The motives behind the American policy of exerting pressure on the EU to take Turkey in 
might be explained in the expectations of the American Government that the bilateral 
problems between Greece and Turkey would be solved once and for all if Turkey and 
Cyprus became full members of the Union. 
The US government was expecting from the Luxembourg summit that the EU would at 
least offer Turkey a membership perspective and lead Turkey to take up a more 
reconcilable position regarding the accession of Cyprus to the Union.24 But now, the EU 
made the solution of the Cyprus problem within the Union impossible by excluding 
Turkey from the EU enlargement and provoking her to take steps with the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus, parallel to what the EU does with Greek Cypriot 
Republic.25 The primary difference between the American and European attitudes 
towards Turkey became more obvious during the debates on Turkey's entry into the EU. 
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While the Americans have been evaluating Turkey in strategic terms and trying to keep 
her in the Western Security structure, and pressing the Europeans to admit Turkey to their 
Club, the Europeans lack a strategic point of view. Instead they emphasize economic, 
cultural and political aspects of relations as the foremost COI).Siderations that must be 
taken into account before Turkey's admission to the Union. 26 
4.2 NATO Context 
With the end of W. W.II, the European Continent came under the control of the American 
government due to the emergence of the communist threat in the East and the Europeans' 
dire need for economic improvement. Alongside with the economic aid, the Americans 
used also their superior military capabilities to control the developments in the continent. 
Although the NATO organization was established to provide security for the western 
European countries, it became clear that the countries located in the Balkans and the 
southeastern Europe also needed military protection. Successive American governments 
initiated a military and economic aid program under the policy of "containment of 
communism". The Truman Doctrine of 194 7 and the Marshall Program of 1948 were 
designated with these goals in mind. The reason why the US developed a lively interest to 
keep the small countries of the Balkans, especially Greece and Turkey, in the western 
camp, lies in the importance of the strategic locations of these countries. Holding the 
gateways to the Aegean and the Mediterranean Sea, and making the passage of the Soviet 
fleet to these hot waters extremely difficult, both Greece and Turkey might play an 
important role in the strategic planning of NATO to contain the Soviet Union. 27 In 
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addition, the Civil war in Greece during the period of 1946 and 1949, and the territorial 
claims of the Soviets on Turkey, demanding that the latter ceded Kars and Ardahan to the 
Soviet Union were major factors that forced both Greece and Turkey to seek security in 
the western world. Open and active support of the communist Yugoslav government to 
the communist fractions in Greece frightened the liberal countries of the West that if 
Greece fell under communism, this might adversely affect other Balkan countries by 
exposing them to threats of Soviet domination. Taking such considerations into account 
the west supported the royalist and the liberal wing of the civil struggle and in the end 
enabled them to win the war.28 
The entry of Greece and Turkey to NATO did not tum out to be as easy as it was 
expected. Founding on the grounds of providing security for the western European 
countries, NA TO appeared a kind of western European organization in the beginning. 
Some of its members, especially the northern European ones, were against the inclusion 
of Turkey and Greece into the organization, on the grounds that these two were not 
sharing the same cultural and historical traditions like them, and that, if they were 
included, their share of military aid would decrease. 29 As a result, Turkey and Greece had 
to wait membership until both had sent their troops to Korea to fight on the side of the 
western world against communism. By then, communist expansionism had gathered 
momentum which in turn led the West to reassess Turkey and Greece for their security. 
From 1952 onwards the inclusion of these two in NATO seemed more profitable for the 
western block than for the parties themselves. 
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In the containment of the Soviet Union, Greece and Turkey did not only come together 
inside NATO, but they also began to cooperate under the roof of the Balkan Pact of 1954 
founded by Turkey and Greece together with Yugoslavia. The foundation of such a 
regional organization was also backed by the US as part of the policy of containment.30 
In the first years of their membership in NATO, both Greece and Turkey identified their 
national interests with those of the western world, especially of the US. Until the eruption 
of the Cyprus dispute in the mid-1950s, the trilateral relationship among Greece, Turkey, 
and NATO was in complete harmony. But with the emergence of the Cyprus problem, 
the relations between Greece and Turkey began to deteriorate, affecting the operability 
and effectiveness of NATO's strategies in the Eastern Mediterranean. Until the refusal by 
the Greek government headed by Karamanlis not to participate in NATO's military 
exercises in the Aegean Sea in 1955 following the September 6 and 7 events in Istanbul, 
the relations were not interrupted by any conflict.31 But the refusal of Greece to join 
military exercises would become a model for the years to come. Whenever she felt that 
NATO was tilting towards Turkey and becoming silent to what she called Turkey's 
irredentist polices in the region, she chose to boycott the exercises. 
By the first half of 1960s, the NATO-Turkey bilateral relations were near to perfect. 
However, the emergence of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 which later resulted in the 
eventual redeployment of the Herkul Missiles from Turkey, in the process of reciprocal 
give-and-take negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union, and finally the rudely 
written letter that President Johnson of US sent to Turkey's Prime Minister ismet inonii 
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following the crisis in Cyprus in the middle of 1964, cast a shadow over the relations and 
eventually resulted in a new policy of searching for alternatives for Turkey. Until the 
eruption of this crisis, the Turkish authorities were sure of full NATO's guarantee in case 
of a Soviet attack on herself. But this crisis had displayed to Turkey that it was by no 
means certain that the US and NATO would come to Turkey's rescue immediately. This 
was even implied in the letter of the President Johnson to inonii. 
Following the crisis, the Turkish government of that time had initiated a search for other 
security alternatives to NATO. The upshot was a kind of multidimensional foreign policy 
implemented with the aim of improving the relations with the Soviet Union and the 
Arabic countries. The importance of this letter crisis lies in the fact that Turkey realized 
for the first time that the US' (NATO) global interests might not always be in complete 
harmony with hers. 32 But one should state that the emergence of grievances in Turkey 
about NATO did not necessarily hamper the military activities of NA TO in the Aegean 
Sea because Turkey did not wish to act against NATO. Instead, she tried to insert some 
clauses into the bilateral treaties with the US that limited the actions of the US military 
establishment on her territory. 
The second turning point was the arms embargo imposed on Turkey by the US Congress 
on the ground, that the use of American-provided weapons in the Cyprus Operation in 
1974 was against the foreign military aid act of the US government. In fact, the Ford 
government of the US was not so eager to punish Turkey just because she had used 
American weapons. But the Congress under the influence of the Greek lobby enacted 
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such an embargo. These differing attitudes by the US government and the Congress 
towards Turkey was revealing the discrepancies in the perception of Turkey's value in 
the US. While the administrations were talcing into consideration the strategic location of 
Turkey and her contributions to the western security, the Congress was not able to 
evaluate Turkey objectively due to ethics politics. 33 Of these ethnic groups working 
against Turkey, the Greeks and the Armenians have been the most influential. After the 
imposition of the embargo, the Demirel government reciprocated by closing some US 
military bases in Turkey. Until the abolition of the embargo by the Carter government in 
1978, these military installations remained closed, and, therefore, the operation and 
information gathering capabilities of NATO became disabled. 
As to the relations of Greece with the US and NATO during the Cold War era, it is 
interesting to note that the influence of the US governments on Greece's both domestic 
and foreign policies was much more than on Turkey. Having been much more dependent 
on the US' economic and military aid, the Greek governments were very sensitive to the 
changes in the foreign policy attitudes of the US. In other words, the Greeks were more 
lenient than the Turks to show their grievances and anxieties with respect to the US' 
actions. Having not got rid of the psychology ofbeing a small country, it was more likely 
to expect and observe tensions in the US-Greek bilateral relations. 34 
Before 1974, the grievances of Greece about US foreign policy should be looked at 
within the approach of US governments to the solution of the Cyprus dispute. Because 
the Greek governments perceived that the US was tilting to Turkey and overvaluing her 
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strategic position in terms of superpower relations, they were against the settlement of the 
dispute within the NATO framework. Their fear of any NATO involvement in the dispute 
stemmed also from the influence of Turkey in that organization. Therefore the Greeks 
objected to the deployment of NATO forces on the island during the well-known 1964 
crisis. The US proposal of sending a NATO force to the island to calm down the crisis 
and to prevent the military clashes from getting out of hand was rejected by Greece. In 
the end a UN force (UNFICYP) was sent. A second event that provoked the Greek 
authorities not to trust the Americans in their relations with Turkey came about during the 
1967 Gecitkale Crisis. 
When the Greeks began to infiltrate their combat troops to the island clandestinely after 
1964, and their number reached approximately 12 thousands by 1967, the Turkish 
authorities feared that the Greek Cypriots might again start a massacre of the Turks. 
Ankara threatened to intervene militarily. The ensuing crisis that erupted during the 
summer of 1967 is very significant, since the Turkish government might have intervened 
militarily following the military assaults of the Greeks on the Turks. The crisis was 
prevented from leading to a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey through 
the US brokering at the last instance, according to which the Greeks had to pull their 
mainland troops from the island in return for Turkey's non-intervention.35 Although the 
Greeks pulled back their troops from the island, this was not only because of the Greeks' 
fear of Turkey's military superiority but also because of the legitimacy problem of the 
new military regime in Athens. Thus the new regime needed the support of the US 
government to stay in power, and therefore, it was not difficult for the US to convince the 
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colonels to pull back their soldiers. This event did once again lead the Greeks to conclude 
that the Americans were pro-Turkish regarding bilateral realtions. 36 
The attitude of the US and NATO to the solution of the Cyprus problem during the cold 
war era was also a source of mistrust in Greece. The former were asking the parties to 
continue the strategic balance in Cyprus, founded by the 1960 treaties, and to avoid any 
action of hampering the status quo. Whereas the Turkish governments were sharing the 
considerations of the US and NATO, Greece could not digest the solution of 1960. In 
other words, while the security interests of the western alliance and the national interests 
of Turkey were overlapping in Cyprus, the Greek government was not satisfied with a 
NATO solution on the island because it rejected the union of the island with the mainland 
Greece. 
The culminating event of Greece's mistrust of the NATO and the US took place with the 
withdrawal of Greece from the military wing of the organization in the aftermath of the 
1974 Peace Operation of Turkey. Although the Greek government of that time asked 
NATO to prevent Turkey from landing her troops on the island, the US kept her silence 
and somehow acquiesced to the operation of Turkey. The Greeks went further in 
believing that it was the US that supported and emboldened the military to grasp the 
power in 1967, and then to incite the military to instigate a coup in Cyprus in the summer 
of 1974.37 The disruption of the NATO activities in the region became more noticeable 
after the withdrawal of Greece from NATO. 
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As to the problems caused by the divergent approaches by Greece and Turkey within 
NATO, the command and control responsibilities in the Aegean Sea are the most 
important ones since these problems always affected the operability and effectiveness of 
NATO in the region. From 1952 to the withdrawal of Greece from the NATO, the parties 
always felt the effect of the NATO arrangements. 
"Prior to 1974 two Izmir based subcommands (LANDSOUTHEAST) and 
(SIXATAF) controlled Greek and Turkish land and air operations. Senior US 
officials coordinated Greek and Turkish commanders, each of whom had 
operational responsibility within sovereign national territory. There were no 
difficulties regarding land operations but the Turks objected to the assignment to 
Greece of an air operational area corresponding to the Athens Flight Information 
Region-the entire region except for the narrow band of Turkish national airspace 
about a minute's flying time to Anatolian coast. The Greek chiefs of naval staff, 
based in Athens was responsible for the waters of the Aegean, Cretan, and 
Ionian Seas (COMEDEAST) and a Turkish admiral, based in Ankara, for the 
territorial waters in the Mediterranean, Aegean, the Dardenneles and the Black 
Sea (COMEDNORTHEAST). Both reported to the Commander of Allied Forces 
Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH) in Naples."38 
Although this was the situation before 1974, it changed a lot after Greece left NATO. 
Turkey took many command and control responsibilities. As the years passed, Greece 
understood that she had made a mistake by leaving the alliance, because Turkey was 
representing the alliance in the region and going to receive much of the military aid. As it 
was the case, the Karamanlis Government wanted to return to the alliance, because the 
pre-1974 arrangements were in favor of Greece but now to the advantages of Turkey. 39 
"The Greek terms for returning to NATO's military wing were the establishment of a 
landquarter (COMLANDSOUTCENT) and a tactical au headquarters 
(COMSEVEVATAF) at Larissa under Greek command, and restoration of status quo 
ante as regards the Aegean operational responsibilities.'..io 
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In addition to the allocation of command and control responsibilities in the region, there 
took place some other problems resulting from the attempts of the parties to mobilize the 
organization against each other. For example, the Greek governments have not been 
participating in the military exercises in the region fort the last 14 years just because 
NATO did not include the Lemnos Island in the military plannings.41 The underlying 
reason behind Greece's attempt to have NATO include this island in the planning of 
maneuvers is her desire to prove that the arrangements that have been regulating the 
demilitarized status of her islands in front of the Dardannels are not valid any more. The 
latest example of the Gavdhos issue is again reminiscent of the same problem. This time 
the Turkish government objected to the inclusion of the Gavdhos Island in the NATO 
Exercise of "DYNAMIC MIX 1996" to take place in the area of Crete due to its disputed 
status of property. 
Utilization of the organization by Greece gained a new momentum after the election of 
Papendrou in October, 1981. As soon as the new government came to power, it asked the 
organization to give a security guarantee to herself against Turkey during the annual 
Defense Planning Committee in November 1981. But the organization rejected such a 
demand, on the grounds that NATO could not give a security guarantee to one of its 
members against the other. 42 In terms of the tough stand of the respective Papandreu 
governments towards the US and NATO, one thing is clear that is the domestic political 
considerations behind the gevernments' actions. He firmly believed, like many Greeks, 
that NATO was not impartial and tilted to Turkey, but that his hostile attitude towards 
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Turkey and NATO emanated from domestic considerations. In other words, Papandreu 
used his policy of hostility towards Turkey and NATO in order to get support of the 
military staff and conservative circles in Greece. To justify the legitimacy of his socialist 
rule, he needed the approval of the military. Therefore, the implementation of an hostile 
policy towards Turkey seemed a very suitable ground for him to rally various circles in 
Greece around himself.43 This policy was also in harmony with his aim of securing the 
civilian control over military. As an expert put it: 
"His tough stand on Turkey and his general emphasis on nationalism 
strongly appeal to many officers; especially those from middle class and 
peasant background for whom nationalism and populism had always 
been attractive. ·.44 
A possible derivation from the attempts of the parties to utilize the organization against 
each other might be that neither of them could manage to identify their security 
considerations with those of the organization. Instead of harmonizing their security 
policies with those of NATO, they chose to verify their respective objectives through 
NATO. This might have been resulted from their perception that NATO's hands-off 
policy, while intended to project the Alliance's impartiality and encourage both nations to 
settle down their disputes, paradoxically produced the opposite effect. "Ankara and 
Athens logically surmise that the southeastern flank is accorded low priority and this 
gives them little reason to place NATO priorities before their own'.45 
Now, in the post cold war atmosphere the role of the NATO in the solution of Turco-
Greek disputes increased. The reasons of why a possible NATO involvement might 
create an atmosphere conducive to an overall settlement between Greece and Turkey are 
taken up in the fifth chapter. Nevertheless, here it might be a good idea to present the 
65 
latest agreement between Turkey and Greece concerning the allocation of command and 
control responsibilities in the Aegean Sea in order to prove that the NATO platforms 
constitute suitable grounds for these countries to work. During the NATO meetings in the 
first days of December 1997, these countries signed a tentative accord concerning this 
problem. Although this accord needs to be approved by their parliaments in order to take 
effect, the NATO Military Council and Defense Planning Committee have already 
approved this tentative agreement. According to this accord, NATO will set up two 
regional sub-commands, one in Izmir, and the other at Larissa, which will mainly be 
responsible for land operations. In both headquarters, Greek and Turkish officers will 
work together and a rotation system will be applied to high command positions. 
As far as naval and air operations are concerned, these headquarters will have limited 
functions. Their main function will be to report to NATO's main southern command 
headquarters in Naples. The Izmir and Larissa centers will not have predetermined areas 
of responsibilities concerning air and naval operations. Under these regulations, the 
headquarters in Naples is having the command and control responsibilities in the Aegean 
Sea directly on itsel£46 
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CHAPTER 5: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION WITHIN NATO FRAMEWORK 
New ideas and solution proposals are hard to come by in the long-standing Turco-Greek 
dispute. The existence of all the problems pose very great dangers to the security and the 
stability of the region. Without their settlement, no one can expect an environment that is 
very secure, stable and conducive to peace in the area. Before trying to formulate a 
solution proposal one should clearly define the existing problems between the parties. By 
now the major points of friction include the Aegean problems, ranging from the extension 
of the territorial waters to the militarization of the eastern Aegean Islands, and the 
protracted Cyprus problem. In the following pages, an attempt will be made to put forth 
the major points of view in approaching the problems and then the basic points of 
consideration in the solution process will be examined. The aim will be to prove the 
futility and danger of utilizing the EU and the needs and benefits of utilizing NATO 
framework instead. 
Though the reasons of the existing disputes have been considered the most important 
obstacles before any solution, the prevailing approaches that are used to analyze the 
current situation in bilateral relations on the both shores of the Sea outweigh the former. 
Existing approaches to resolving the disputes both in Greece and Turkey are the major 
reasons of the current deadlock, thus the special causes of the contemporary problems 
hold secondary places compared to these well-established approaches, or ways of 
thinking. One of today's approaches traces the causes of the current problems to the 
pages of history books. 1 Logically, this approach takes the eleventh century as the 
67 
departure point of the developments in bilateral relations, first between the Ottoman 
Selcuks Turks and the Byzantines, then between the Ottoman Turks and the Byzantines, 
and finally between the Greeks of the modem Greek State and the Turks of modem 
Turkey. This approach assumes that there has been a continuation between the past and 
the present in the process of the emergence of the contemporary problems. To apply this 
approach to today's problems will definitely lead us to formulate wrong calculations vis-
a-vis the causes of the problems. Instead, the causes of the current problems between 
Greece and Turkey should be looked at within the context of the developments of 
nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. 
Without focusing on the developments of the early nineteenth century that took place in 
the aftermath of the French Revolution, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to 
truly analyze the dynamics of the bilateral Turco-Greek relations. In the emergence of the 
fundamental attitudes and prejudices both in Greece and Turkey with respect to 
evaluating the other side, the nineteenth century developments played a major role. The 
so-called "Megali Idea" of the Greek nation is a production of the developments that 
brought about the Modem Greek State. Moreover, the current Aegean Sea problems and 
the Cyprus problem have very little to do with the past. The causes of these contemporary 
problems relate to the developments of the Cold war atmosphere. While the Cyprus 
dispute began to emerge in the mid-1950s, the Aegean problems became complicated in 
the aftermath of Turkey's 1974 Cyprus military operation. 
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According to this historical approach, the reasons of all the current problems lie in the 
Greeks' Megali Idea dream.2 To put all the people of Greek-origin under the same Greek 
rule is the main reason why the Greeks have pursued an irredentist policy towards first 
the Ottoman Empire and then the modem Turkey. All the attempts by Greek governments 
at militarizing the Aegean islands and achieving the union of Cyprus with the Greek 
mainland have strenghtened this conviction in Turkey. While this has been the perception 
of the Greek behavior in Turkey, the policies of the latter are being considered in the 
same manner in Greece. So the Greeks evaluate Turkey's actions in the same way of 
irredentism. 
The second approach, that is generally called "humanistic approach", assumes that these 
two nations have every reason to become friends and no reason to become enemies. The 
common cultural traditions ranging from musical styles to food preferences constitute the 
necessary grounds for friendship and good-neighbourliness. Five centuries have created 
the conditions of friendship. This approach puts the blame for the contemporary problems 
on the politicians.3 They are the ones who have been utilizing the problems in both 
countries in order to get votes in elections. The way the politicians behave in election 
times increases the misunderstandings and deepens the existing problems. According to 
this explanation, when the election times come, politicians make assertive claims about 
bilateral problems, making it impossible to resolve them, and then when the time comes 
to negotiate these problems seriously, it becomes very difficult for them to deny what 
they said prior to the elections and to prepare the public for a possible negotiation 
process. In other words, the politicians on both shores of the Sea are being kept hostages 
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to what they generally say during the election times just to gain popularity in domestic 
political life. 
The fear that their people might perceive them as betraying their countries by negotiating 
with the other side is the major reason why the politicians particularly in Greece avoid 
negotiations. The proponents of this view which holds politicians responsible are 
generally called "humanistic". This humanistic approach assumes that there is no need to 
become foes, instead there is everything available for both nations to live in peace and 
harmony. I think the latest crisis in the Balkans, the Bosnian War, has refuted this 
humanistic argument by showing to the world that it was not enough to have so many 
things, even marriages, in common for achieving peace in a region. Although the 
belligerent parties in the war have been sharing a common political, cultural, and 
economical history for centuries, they could not prevent this war. A cursory look at 
warring nations all over the world would reveal that in nine cases out of ten it was the 
neighbors who have had very much in common fought ferociously. 4 
It seems that a new way of thinking is necessary to overcome difficulties in the way of a 
solution between Turkey and Greece. First of all, the parties should give utmost 
importance to the preservation of the balance between themselves which was created by 
the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. The provisions of this treaty regulated bilateral relations 
until the parties attempted to alter the existing balance in their favor. In this regard the 
Greek attempts to militarize the Eastern Aegean Islands off the Turkish coast, Greece's 
attempt extending its territorial waters beyond the existing six miles, turning the Aegean 
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Sea into a Greek lake, and the unification of Cyprus with mainland Greece were 
perceived by Turkey as a calculated attempt by Athens at changing the Lausanne balance. 
On the other hand, the Greek governments have been accusing Turkey of altering the 
status quo both in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus. The de facto partition of Cyprus in the 
aftermath of the 1974 military operation has been referred to by Greece as evidence to 
prove their arguments. The Greek governments also accuse Turkey of trying to alter the 
status quo in the Aegean Sea. 
Secondly, the 1960 Constitution that established the independent Cyprus State should be 
considered as the starting point of any solution process of the Cyprus dispute. As it was 
the case with the Lausanne treaty, the 1960 Constitution did also establish a balance both 
between the communities on the island and between the motherland countries. This 
arrangement projected the existing balance between Greece and Turkey on the island.5 
The third, related with the first two, requires the parties' respect to the international 
treaties and conventions that have regulated the current relations. This, of course, should 
not mean that only the legalistic approach should take precedence in the solution process; 
instead the political, economic, and security considerations of the parties should be 
backed by legality. The method to be applied to reach a solution has been a sort of 
problem between the parties since the emergence of the disputes. While the Greek side 
has been emphasizing the priority of the legalistic approach, Turkey supports the use of 
political approaches, by stating that the parties should first try to negotiate and then apply 
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the other methods, including arbitration, if they themselves could not come to a 
compromise. 
Fourth, parties to the conflict should handle all the problems together. The past has 
shown that it was needless just to concentrate on one of the problems and make the 
solution of that problem as a precondition to move on to the others. The typical example 
of the failure of this approach is the solution process of the Cyprus dispute. The Greek 
governments' disposition to the Cyprus problem has been backed by the international 
world in their attempts to bring forth some solution proposals only tailored for Cyprus. 
Since the first mediation efforts of the international community, we could not see any 
solution attempt that aims at solving all the existing problems on a give-and-take basis. 
Therefore, all the problems have remained unsolved. It is now clear that the parties 
approach the problems differently. While Turkey has been insisting that the Aegean 
problems are more likely to endanger stability and security, and they should first be 
solved, the Greek governments have been continuing to reiterate that it is impossible and 
unlikely to handle the Aegean problems before the parties solve the Cyprus dispute. 6 A 
kind of give-and-take approach should be used; otherwise it would be inconceivable to 
reach a compromise. 
Fifth, the international organizations to which both parties are member should be more 
active in the solution process. In this regard the important point should be the 
preservation of the balance between the parties. In other words, the possible involvement 
of some organizations such as the EU should be taken with a pinch of salt as one party is 
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a member of it while the other is not. The organizations to which only one of the parties 
is attached cannot help taking sides in the solution process. It would be logical to surmise 
that these organizations should support the arguments of their members. Given this 
possible danger, the use of international organizations, for instance, the United Nations 
(UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), ancflthe North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be given priority, since these bodies 
possess the potentials of providing the parties to the conflicts with possible grounds to 
cooperate and perhaps reach a consensus. In fact the importance of these bodies stems 
from their capabilities of providing the parties with open communication channels and 
with the means for corridor diplomacy. The most important thing the parties should keep 
in mind is the preservation of the balance between them. Therefore, the efforts of these 
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aforementioned international organizations should be backed. Involvement of the 
organizations in which both nations are not on an equal footing might impair the existing 
balance between the parties. The UN has already been involved in the Cyprus dispute, 
since the emergence of the crisis in the early 1960s, first by sending in international 
peace-keeping troops to monitor the military activities of the communities, and then by 
appointing special mediators.7 The role of the UN should be assisted in terms of possible 
frameworks for any solution. 8 
Sixth, the parties to the conflict should give their consent to any US involvement in the 
solution process. Being the only capable country, the US might help create a suitable 
atmosphere for a negotiation process. The influence of the US on both countries cannot 
be outweighed in the near future by any other third party. Given that the US pays utmost 
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attention to the security and stability of the area for her global interests, and both Greece 
and Turkey are dependent on it through various means, the possibility of US brokering a 
peace between the parties is high. Since the initiation of the special trilateral relationship 
among the US, Turkey, and Greece after the last two chose to accept the security 
umbrella of the former, we have been witnessing important changes in the format of the 
relations. 9 In this regard one might wonder that why the US could not succeed in bringing 
these two to a consensus. The reasons lie in the realities of the cold war. Given that the 
most important priority of the US was to contain the Soviet Union all over the world, the 
US had to act cautiously not to offend one of the parties to the conflict. To propose a 
detailed solution proposal including all the thorny issues between Greece and Turkey 
might have been perceived by either party as favoring the other side. 10 Therefore, it was 
enough for the US just to calm down the crisis and prevent the sides from fighting. 
After the end of Cold war the characteristics of the international relations and regimes 
have changed considerably. The walls of the cold war world that were keeping the parties 
in check not to disrupt the harmony and stability have fallen, and the probability of 
military confrontations has increased. In the absence of a framework that was helping the 
parties to combine their interests, both Greece and Turkey are now more likely to fight 
even for the small and uninhabited islets of the Aegean Sea, as the latest Kardak/lmia 
crisis has shown. As the probability of military confrontation is increasing, the incentives 
for the solution of the problems through US involvement should also increase. 
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Nowadays, there are many reasons why the parties may want to see a more active US 
involvement. Although there is a general conviction in Greece that the US tilts to Turkey, 
the involvement of the US is important for the Greek military interests by keeping the 
prevailing 7 to 10 ratio in American military aids to parties. The Greeks believe that it 
was the US that emboldened the military circles in Greece to grasp the power in 1967 
which then acquiesced to Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974 by acting passively not 
to have the NATO forces used to prevent Turkey. However, the respective Greek 
governments did understand the value of the alliance with the US vis-a-vis their relations 
with Turkey. Given that it is only the US that can alter the military balance in the Aegean 
Sea, the Greeks have enough reasons not to offend the Americans. Even though the 
Greek governments have been pursuing a multidimensional foreign policy since the 
foundation of Karamanlis Government in 1974 in order to decrease their dependency on 
the US, they never quit this policy as far as Turkey is concerned. For example The 
Papandreu government was in favor of reductions in military aids to Greece provided that 
the existing 7. to 10 ratio would remain. 11 
Secondly, Greece has the advantage of using her lobby in the US to affect the organs of 
the decision-making process. It is true that the Greeks are more successful than the Turks 
in mobilizing the US public opinion against Turkey. The role of the Greek lobby in the 
formulation of the US Congress' pro-Greek resolutions is well known, and this seems to 
remain in the absence of a powerful Turkish lobby.12 Although the American 
administrations appear to take Turkey more seriously than Greece in the post cold war 
era, there is no doubt that Greece through its powerful lobby in Washington D.C. is still 
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able to influence US policy-making process. In this way Athens should have no reason 
for suspicion that more American involvement in the resolution of the Turco-Greek 
disputes would favor Turkey. After all, the US and the US-led NATO are probably the 
only source of arbitration, given that Turkey would never acquiesce to EU brokering 
simply because Greece has been, and will be, able to mobilize the Union against Turkey 
thanks to her full membership. 
Turkey might also benefit from the involvement of the US. There are some points that 
Turkey con not ignore as far as the US is concerned. First of all, the characteristics of the 
bilateral relations between Turkey and the US have not changed considerably since the 
end of the Cold War. Although some new dimensions were added to the old ones and 
some lost their significance, Turkey is still one of the most important regional strategic 
allies of the US. In other words, Turkey's value in US policy planning has not decreased, 
but it has increased first during the 1990 Gulf War, then during the formulation of 
American policies with respect to the post-Gulf War Middle East, and lastly during the 
debates concerning the politics of the Caspian oil. All these events point to the fact that 
the interests of Turkey and the US coincide as far as the Middle East and Central Asia are 
concerned. 13 In addition, latest developments in Turkish-Israeli relations and the 
emergence of a de facto strategic alliance between these countries has been supported by 
the US. Therefore, Turkey and the US, together with Israel, have initiated a new era of 
cooperation based largely on strategic interests. Given that these two Middle Eastern 
countries have been the natural allies of the US since the end of WWII, and their regional 
interests coincide with each other, it would be unthinkable for the US to pursue a pro-
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Greek stand in Turco-Greek problems. In other words, the use of linkage policy by 
Turkey might lead the US to understand Turkey's conserns in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus 
in return for Turkey's support for US policies in the Middle Eastern and Central Asia. 
Moreover the success of US' "dual containment" policy toward Iraq and Iran depends on 
the support and collaboration of Turkey and Israel as well. 14 Clearly, respective American 
governments would not take initiatives in the Aegean that would hamper Turkey's 
interests. It is more likely than the Greek case that any future American involvement in 
Turco-Greek disputes will yield positive repercussions for Turkey. 
Secondly the involvement of the US is important, like in the Greek case, for the 
maintenance of the military balance in the Aegean. As the 1975 US' embargo on the 
military aid to Turkey displayed, Turkey is in need of the American military hardware 
and technology not only to preserve the balance with Greece but also to be able to 
modernize its army. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, Turkey should give support to the idea of US initiative as 
opposed to the EU in the solution process. If it were absolute and compulsory that an 
external mechanism will involve in the bilateral disputes, it would be better for Turkey to 
see the US at work. At this point, it is necessary to open a new section to demonstrate 
why the involvement of the EU is to the detriment of the parties and against the major 
principles characterizing the bilateral relations. 
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As the latest Bosnia War demonstrated, the EU has been unable to formulate a common 
foreign and security policy regarding the developments even in its neighborhood. 15 The 
inability of the EU to speak with one voice prevents its attempts from yielding 
constructive results. It is also conceivable that the EU might not be as impartial as the US 
as far as the Turco-Greek relations are concerned. Given that Greece has been a full 
member of the Union since 1981, it is illogical to expect a fully neutral policy from the 
Union itself. The impartiality of the EU becomes a problem as long as the Cyprus dispute 
is being tried to be solved under the EU :framework. Following the Greek Cypriots' 
application for EU membership in 1990 and the acceptance of it by the Union, the Cyprus 
dispute came to the agenda of the EU once again in 1995, when the Greek Cyprus 
Republic was talked about during the customs union negotiations with Turkey. During 
these negotiations, the Greek government pressurized other EU members to have the 
Greek Cyprus Republic included in membership process. Because the decisions in the EU 
are taken in unanimity, the Greek government could easily blackmail the policies of other 
member countries. 
There took place many discussions about the validity of the application and the feasibility 
of any solution of the Cyprus problem under the EU framework. 16 As stated before, the 
strategic balance between Greece and Turkey on the island should be maintained as a 
precondition for stability and peace. Under the circumstances, Greece is a full member of 
the Union while Turkey not, the eventual membership of the Greek Cypriot Government 
either alone or representing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as well, would alter 
the strategic balance between the parties at the expense of Turkey and the Turks in 
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Cyprus. Regarding the validity of the Greek Cypriot's application or the possible 
acceptance of it to the membership, the 1960 Constitution that founded the independent 
Cyprus State should be the starting point for discussions. First of all, it is against the 
provisions of the aforementioned constitution for the Cyprus Government to join any 
international institution of which both Turkey and Greece are not members. Secondly, for 
the realization of the membership, the consent of each community on the island has to be 
secured. The Turkish community made it clear that it opposes EU membership before a 
comprehensive solution. Thirdly, the "most favored nation' status of mother countries 
over Cyprus would change to the detriment of Turkey in case of Cyprus's EU 
membership because Greece and Cyprus will come under the same EU roof while Turkey 
remaining outside. 17 
The people who advocate Cyprus's membership in the European Union claim that the 
1960 constitution is not valid anymore because the status quo that was established by this 
treaty was first disrupted in 1963 when the Turkish community quit their governmental 
post because of their fear for their lives, and then by the de facto partition of the island 
after the 1974 Turkish military intervention. Therefore, the articles of that constitution 
cannot be applied to the circumstances of today. They also try to show that the Turkish 
community on the island would gain the most if the island became a EU member.18 
According to their reasoning, the Turkish Cypriots would get rid of the strict conditions 
of the economic embargo put on them by the Greek Cypriots and then would find easy 
access to European markets, and they would prosper. In addition, Turkey would also use 
the presence of this Turkish community in the Union for lobbying efforts. To support 
79 
their arguments, these circles go on to say that the Turkish language would be recognized 
as one of the official languages spoken in the EU. 
There are enough reasons to reject these arguments. First of all, if Cyprus joins the 
Union, Turkey would lose her security guarantee over the Turkish community in the 
island because it would be illogical and nonsensical for Turkey to continue to provide a 
kind of security umbrella for one of the members of the Union. Secondly, the Greek 
Cypriots would manage to achieve their goal of enosis through the back door. In fact a 
kind of federative structure is against the major principles of the Union. The fundamental 
preconditions of the Turkish community, before any federative kind of solution, are the 
denial of traveling, settlement, and owning property rights to the Greek Cypriots in the 
Turkish North. These demands would be surpassed automatically after Cyprus' EU 
membership due to EU statutes. 19 Third, it is hard to expect that the Turkish community 
would prosper economically since the conditions of the Western Thrace Turks point to 
the opposite. Fourth, it is highly likely that the Greek Cypriots would swallow the 
Turkish community after the membership because it is four times more powerful 
economically than the Turkish community in the island. 
The solution of Cyprus problem within the EU framework has become the first priority of 
the Greek Cypriots since 1995 when the EU agreed to Cyprus' inclusion the EU 
enlargement in return for the realization of customs union with Turkey. The Greeks in 
Cyprus try to show that there is peace in the island, therefore, there is no danger for the 
EU countries to think that, if the Greek Cypriots were included into this club, they would 
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import a country that is full of problems. Although this was the main target of Greeks, 
their decision to bring in S-300 missiles from the Russian Federation seems to contradict 
with this policy aims. In the beginning, they were thinking that if they deployed these 
missiles into their territories, the Turks would probably make some concession to them in 
return for their non-deployment. In other words, their move of deploying these missiles 
would force the Turkish side to come to terms with them in the bargaining process. As 
someone notices the condition that the Greeks Cypriots put before the Turkish side, de-
militarization of the whole island, in return for their non-deployment, it would not 
become difficult to guess the underlying reasons of the Greek Cypriots'. But this policy 
seemed to backfire when Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus decided to 
escalate the crisis. 
This time Turkey threatened to take measures, including military ones, to deal with these 
missiles if they were deployed. All these Turkish moves appeared to have been designed 
to show to the EU countries that the Cyprus dispute is not solved and will not be solved if 
the Greeks in Cyprus became a member of the Union. The decision of Turkey and the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus that if Greek Cypriots were taken in the Club, they 
will start the process of integration of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus with Turkey 
was also taken under the considerations mentioned above. However, the latest decision of 
the leaders of the EU countries, held in Luxembourg on December 12, 1997, to add the 
Greek Cypriot Republic to the list of countries with whom the membership negotiations 
will start in May, 1998, shows that the Turkish side failed in Cyprus. And, the solution 
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prospects of the Cyprus dispute on the basis ofbi-zonnal and bi-communal federation did 
become even harder .. 
As long as the international community continues to recognize the Greek Government as 
the only official state of the island, it would be really difficult to expect the Greek 
Cypriots to negotiate with the Turks. For the Greek Cypriots, the present situation on the 
island is better than any kind of federal structure in which the Turks would have equal 
share in the government. 20 While all these are obvious, the involvement of the Union in 
bilateral disputes would be very unlikely to yield any result conducive to peace because 
the EU has lost its impartiality, siding with Greece as the latest Imia/Kardak crisis 
showed. Like the Greek Government, the Union has also suggested to the parties that 
they should submit the issue to the International Court of Justice in the Haugue. Despite 
this, the EU should not be disregarded in the solution proposals. What we suggest is that 
the mechanisms of the Union, especially the membership perspectives, might help the 
parties solve their problems. In other words, if the EU takes up a prudent attitude by 
offering membership both to Turkey and to Greek Cypriots contingent on their full 
success of the solution of their problems, the solution process would most probably 
accelerate. The EU could play a complementary role in the process. 
As the history of relations between NATO and the respective countries has already been 
looked at in Chapter 4, possible influence of this organization over these countries cannot 
be comparable to other international bodies of which both Greece and Turkey are 
members. During the climate of the cold war atmosphere, NATO was not so active and 
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eager to find an overall solution to bilateral problems. Instead it was enough for it just to 
calm down tensions and maintain the operability of the organization in the region. For the 
US, NATO was a platform to confine the tensions and possible confrontations between 
Turkey and Greece. However, in the aftermath of the cold war many people expected that 
this atmosphere would change radically due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 
most important source of threat to the western alliance, and that tranquillity would prevail 
in the region. In contrast, the level of tension in bilateral relations did not decrease. If 
anything, it increased, bringing the two countries to the brink of military confrontations. 
Being left free of the cold war's high discipline, both Greece and Turkey felt freer to 
voice their arguments openly. Tension in the Aegean Sea did not come to the point of 
military confrontations thanks to the involvement of the US at the last moment. 
In other words, the situation during the cold war and now is a bit different. During the 
cold war era, while the US did not want to see Turkey and Greece fight each other and 
endanger the stability and security in the region, the respective countries were also as 
eager not to push matters to an extreme. Neither the US nor the respective countries could 
dare to destabilize the region by creating a military confrontation, exposing the region to 
Soviet influence. The threat of the Soviet Union did restrict their alternatives to nothing 
but to cooperation. Because the US governments were cognizant of the fact that neither 
Greece nor Turkey would dare to fight, it was easier for the US to intervene at the last 
point and prevent the parties from military confrontations. 
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But now the situation has changed. While the US is maintaining its vigilance and 
willingness to keep the region free of military confrontations and is ready to do 
everything in its power, neither Greece nor Turkey is so much adamant not to fight now. 
In other words, under the changed international climate, both of them may risk certain 
things and experience a hot confrontation. The likelihood of a military confrontation is 
now higher than before. The reasons why the US governments might do everything just 
to see the region stable and secure lies in its overall global and regional interests. As the 
latest war in Bosnia proved, the possibility of military confrontations and the emergence 
of threats to European security and stability is more in this region. 
In a broader sense, after the elimination of the Soviet threat, the address of threats to 
European security has changed to other directions. Given the fragility of the current 
borders and the old established claims of almost every state over the others makes this 
region a real powderkeg. Moreover, it is certain that if Greece and Turkey, the most 
powerful countries of the region go to war, other countries might also be dragged in. This 
kind of eventuality would mean a very serious blow to the American prestige and 
interests in the region. In addition, the place of Turkey in overall American strategic 
planning, ranging from the Central Asia through the Middle East to the Eastern 
Mediterranean increase the value of keeping Turkey secure, stable, and European-
oriented. To see a Turkey which is embroiled in a full-blown fight against Greece would 
endanger the US interests in the region. Their latest discussions over the route of oil 
pipelines that will transport the Caspian oil to the western markets has increased the value 
of Turkey in Washington D.C. Beside this, NATO should be involved in the bilateral 
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disputes in order to prove that it was capable of solving problems between conflicting 
parties, and, more importantly, between its members. The logic of this argument lies in 
the possibility that if the countries in the Balkans and the Eastern Europe which desire to 
join in this organization perceive that NATO was really effective in problem-solving, 
they would be more encouraged to continue their NATO membership policies. Even if 
they are not let in immediately, NATO membership perspectives would help these 
countries accomplish this transitionary period in security and stability. The success of 
NATO will increase the credibility of this organization in their eyes.21 In addition, NATO 
has proven that it was the only organization to provide security and stability to the region, 
as the latest Bosnian war has demonstrated. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
By far major points of friction between Turkey and Greece have been established\ and a 
suggstion is made to the effect that NATO rather than the EU should be used as a conflict 
resolution mechanism in finding a solution to the Turco-Greek dispute. Here some 
projections will be made with respect to the future relations between these two countries. 
As observed by the parties themselves and the world community, Turkey and Greece 
could not continue peaceful and constructive relations of the pre-World War II years after 
the eruption of the Cyprus conflict into violence, although, strangely enough, they joined 
NA TO and became strategic allies of the Western world in the early years of the 1950s. 
Instead, they became erstwhile adversaries because of the Cyprus question. And 
gradually while the Cyprus question was becoming complicated due primarily to the 
Greeks' attacks on the Turkish community on the Island, Ankara and Athens added new 
problems arising out of the Aegean Sea to their already shaky relations. Sabre-rattling 
between the two countries continued unabated and gathered momentum in the second 
half the 1960s in Cyprus, and from mid-1970s onwards in the Aegean. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that Turkey and Greece nearly came to blows several times. 
As a result of the continual conflict, there does not appear much hope on either side of the 
Aegean Sea for a fast rapprochement. If anything, because of the Greeks' decision to 
deploy sophisticated Russian-made S-300 missiles on Cyprus to curtail Turkey's air 
superiority, there is large room for extremely pessimistic scenarios, ranging from 
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escalation to a probable armed clash on the Island, in near future. It seems that under the 
circumstances the deadlock will more likely than not continue. 
As explained earlier, one of the reasons for the current deadlock lies in the parties' 
diametrically opposed approaches to a solution process. And the parties do not seem to 
see eye to eye on what points need to be recognised as "questions" to be dealt with 
between the two countries. For instance, while Greece admits that the delimitation of the 
continental shell needs to be drawn between the easternmost Greek Island in the Aegean 
and the Turkish mainland, Turkey asserts that those Greek islands just a few miles off the 
Turkish coast should be treated as a natural continuation of the Turkish mainland, and 
that the delimitation line should be drawn somewhere beyond these islands. As for the 
solution process, while Turkey suggests that the two countries negotiate their differences 
directly, Greece prefers to defer what it recognises as problems to the International Court 
of Justice. 
As for the format of a solution and confidence building measures between the two 
countries, there does not appear to be any consensus either. So far, successive Greek 
governments asserted strongly that unless and until Turkey withdrew all its forces from 
Cyprus unconditionally, no steps would be taken in the way of a solution in the Aegean. 
According to Greece, by keeping her troops on the Island, Turkey has been preventing a 
solution to the Cyprus question. Turkey finds this argument flimsy, saying that it is 
prepared to withdraw a large part of its forces from the Island as a result of lasting 
solution to the conflict. Ankara makes a distinction between the Cyprus conflict and the 
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problems in the Aegean Sea, pointing out that each set of problem should be dealt with 
on its own merits, and that none should be made dependent on the other. 
From these arguments, one might infer that we are faced with an unbreakable deadlock. 
Or alternatively, the whole thing might look to some outsiders as well insiders extremely 
meaningless. Indeed, many suggestions could easily be made, which might bring about a 
solution. For instance, what we have put forth here is a bit different from the both sides' 
approach: a package-deal method, if backed by both sides, would break the deadlock and 
facilitate a solution. Because the problems are very much interwoven, a give-and-take 
approach would be necessary in the solution process to incite the parties to make 
concessions and counter concessions over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. By doing so, it 
would be highly probable that the parties would satisfy their security concerns in these 
regions. One could even speculate that some limited withdrawal of Turkey's military 
presence from Cyprus as a gesture in return for Greece's goodwill in the solution process 
would relieve the Greeks of their security traumas and help confidence-building on the 
Greek side about Turkey's good faith. Similarly, a Greek promise not to extend her 
territorial waters beyond the current 6 miles or to pull back the military installations from 
her eastern Aegean islands would no doubt inspire confidence in policy-making circles in 
Turkey. And as explained earlier, NATO would play an important role in the whole 
process. 
However, these things are easier to say than done. As long as the prevailing mistrust and 
misconceptions in both countries continue to exist, any part of these might appear too 
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radical suggestions for politicians to present to their respective public, as well as for the 
public to digest them. Therefore, the first priority of the parties should be to focus on 
confidence building-measures, which, if properly implemented, might offer both sides to 
learn to live with their differences. To this end, the parties should explore ways to work 
together and learn to make use of NATO for this purpose. 
For instance, both sides may stop their military activities in the Aegean Sea for a short 
time or at least take a long a break during summer seasons. Gradually, they should even 
try to extend it to some years. This would create a cooling-ff period, the main function of 
which would be to accelerate military confidence building between the parties. The 
civilian sectors would make use of this by increasing economic, social and cultural 
transactions. That is to say that both Turkey and Greece should use such a cooling-off 
period to improve their bilateral relations in many aspects with a view to showing each 
other that if one of them tries to damage these relations, its short-term interests would be 
less than its long-term benefits in case their improved relations goes uninterrupted. 
In this respect, businessmen on both sides may play a significant role. They should 
explore new areas of cooperation from which they would earn together. If they do so, it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for politicians to easily disturb good relations in 
order to gain in domestic politics. 
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In the name of solution, use of international organizations of which only one of the 
parties is a member has not been a good method. As the involvement of the EU in the 
Cyprus problem demonstrated, the parties could not reach a compromise on the island, 
and the EU has done nothing but to complicate the question. It has widened the gap 
between the parties. If the EU insists on its policy regarding the membership of Greek 
Cypriot government into the EU, and the Greek Cypriot government gave all its attention 
and priority to EU membership, this process is unlikely to produce a solution on the 
island in near future, since no Greek government would acquiesce to share sovereignty 
with the Turks as long as there has been the possibility of using it on its own. If the EU 
changes its stand and makes it clear that it will accept the island to membership, on 
condition that the communities on the island reach a compromise first; and points out that 
only the federal government on the island may sign the membership treaty, it would be 
highly possible that the local communities would reach a mutually acceptable solution in 
a relatively short time. 
In addition, a possible NATO membership of the island might help the efforts in the 
solution process because all the parties to the conflict -Turkey, Greece, and the local 
communities- are somehow under the NATO roof, and the channels for communication 
within NATO would definitely increase. Otherwise, if the EU maintains its current 
strategy, with the Greek Cypriot government trying to achieve enosis through the back 
door, no-one should expect a mutually satisfied solution; instead these policies will 
certainly accelerate the process of recognition of TRNC by the international community 
or the integration of it with Turkey that would also be a kind of solution second to best. 
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The first and foremost concern of the parties should be the fact that there is no need to 
hurry up in the solution process, given that the existing problems have established for 
many years. 
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